APKPure_v3.20.53_apkpure.com.apk

try to analyze any known explitable CVEs in this apk file? confirm if each CVEs exisitsing in the apk by analyzing the code.

Dr.Binary

I'll analyze the APK file for known exploitable CVEs by examining its code and structure.

Call TodoWrite

Arguments
{"todos": [
  {
    "content": "Extract and analyze APK structure and components",
    "status": "in_progress",
    "activeForm": "Extracting and analyzing APK structure"
  },
  {
    "content": "Identify libraries, dependencies, and versions",
    "status": "pending",
    "activeForm": "Identifying libraries and versions"
  },
  {
    "content": "Search for known CVEs in identified components",
    "status": "pending",
    "activeForm": "Searching for known CVEs"
  },
  {
    "content": "Decompile and analyze code for CVE confirmation",
    "status": "pending",
    "activeForm": "Decompiling and analyzing code"
  },
  {
    "content": "Verify each CVE existence through code analysis",
    "status": "pending",
    "activeForm": "Verifying CVE existence"
  },
  {
    "content": "Generate vulnerability assessment report",
    "status": "pending",
    "activeForm": "Generating assessment report"
  }
]}

Tool result
Todos have been modified successfully. Ensure that you continue to use the todo list to track your progress. Please proceed with the current tasks if applicable

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && apktool d APKPure_v3.20.53_apkpure.com.apk -o apkpure_decompiled 2>&1"}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 137, "stdout": "I: Using Apktool 2.12.0 on APKPure_v3.20.53_apkpure.com.apk with 8 threads\nI: Baksmaling classes.dex...\nI: Loading resource table...\nI: Baksmaling classes3.dex...\nI: Baksmaling classes2.dex...\nI: Decoding file-resources...\nI: Loading resource table from file: /root/.local/share/apktool/framework/1.apk\n", "stderr": ""}"}

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && timeout 120 apktool d APKPure_v3.20.53_apkpure.com.apk -o apkpure_decompiled 2>&1 || echo \"Extraction timeout or error\""}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "Destination directory (/sandbox/apkpure_decompiled) already exists. Use -f switch if you want to overwrite it.\nExtraction timeout or error\n", "stderr": ""}"}

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && rm -rf apkpure_decompiled && unzip -q APKPure_v3.20.53_apkpure.com.apk -d apkpure_extracted && ls -la apkpure_extracted/"}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": "Timeout", "stdout": "", "stderr": ""}"}

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && jadx APKPure_v3.20.53_apkpure.com.apk -d apkpure_jadx --show-bad-code 2>&1 | head -100"}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 137, "stdout": "", "stderr": ""}"}

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && 7z l APKPure_v3.20.53_apkpure.com.apk | grep -E \"(lib/|AndroidManifest|classes)\" | head -30"}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "2025-09-22 20:18:08 .....     10271684      4306436  classes.dex\n2025-09-22 20:18:08 .....      9460584      3948457  classes2.dex\n2025-09-22 20:18:08 .....       302244       133084  classes3.dex\n2025-09-22 20:18:08 .....       219896        88897  lib/arm64-v8a/libBugly_Native.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:08 .....        75744        25935  lib/arm64-v8a/libEncryptorP.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:08 .....       100696        45615  lib/arm64-v8a/libapminsighta.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:08 .....       109384        55904  lib/arm64-v8a/libapminsightb.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:08 .....        10008         3388  lib/arm64-v8a/libbuffer_pg.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:08 .....       113672        61298  lib/arm64-v8a/libbugly_dumper.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:08 .....      1407560       443924  lib/arm64-v8a/libbuglybacktrace.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....        18096         5980  lib/arm64-v8a/libdaemon_acc_v2.1.5.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....        23864        13681  lib/arm64-v8a/libdeflater7z.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....        10008         2337  lib/arm64-v8a/libfile_lock_pg.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....       321880       146111  lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....       261560        82647  lib/arm64-v8a/libhttpdns.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....      1235496       388409  lib/arm64-v8a/libhydeviceid.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....       257624       118129  lib/arm64-v8a/libnms.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....       280848        91140  lib/arm64-v8a/libnrb.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....       170888        81196  lib/arm64-v8a/libqmp.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....        94520        44914  lib/arm64-v8a/libqsealib.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....       338400       129309  lib/arm64-v8a/librmonitor_base.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....       227536        90020  lib/arm64-v8a/librmonitor_memory.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....         8344         3952  lib/arm64-v8a/libtobEmbedPagEncrypt.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....       198724        96285  lib/armeabi-v7a/libBugly_Native.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....        79480        29886  lib/armeabi-v7a/libEncryptorP.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....        83716        39128  lib/armeabi-v7a/libapminsighta.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....        87908        48724  lib/armeabi-v7a/libapminsightb.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....        18044         8321  lib/armeabi-v7a/libbuffer_pg.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....        79880        48643  lib/armeabi-v7a/libbugly_dumper.so\n2025-09-22 20:18:10 .....       939956       379855  lib/armeabi-v7a/libbuglybacktrace.so\n", "stderr": ""}"}

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && 7z x -y APKPure_v3.20.53_apkpure.com.apk AndroidManifest.xml && ls -la AndroidManifest.xml"}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "\n7-Zip 25.01 (x64) : Copyright (c) 1999-2025 Igor Pavlov : 2025-08-03\n 64-bit locale=C.UTF-8 Threads:16 OPEN_MAX:1048576, ASM\n\nScanning the drive for archives:\n1 file, 21084211 bytes (21 MiB)\n\nExtracting archive: APKPure_v3.20.53_apkpure.com.apk\n--\nPath = APKPure_v3.20.53_apkpure.com.apk\nType = zip\nPhysical Size = 21084211\n\nEverything is Ok\n\nSize:       136080\nCompressed: 21084211\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup 136080 Sep 22 20:18 AndroidManifest.xml\n", "stderr": ""}"}

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && 7z x -y APKPure_v3.20.53_apkpure.com.apk \"lib/arm64-v8a/*.so\" >/dev/null 2>&1 && ls -lh lib/arm64-v8a/ | head -20"}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "total 5.1M\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup 215K Sep 22 20:18 libBugly_Native.so\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup  74K Sep 22 20:18 libEncryptorP.so\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup  99K Sep 22 20:18 libapminsighta.so\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup 107K Sep 22 20:18 libapminsightb.so\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup 9.8K Sep 22 20:18 libbuffer_pg.so\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup 112K Sep 22 20:18 libbugly_dumper.so\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup 1.4M Sep 22 20:18 libbuglybacktrace.so\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup  18K Sep 22 20:18 libdaemon_acc_v2.1.5.so\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup  24K Sep 22 20:18 libdeflater7z.so\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup 9.8K Sep 22 20:18 libfile_lock_pg.so\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup 315K Sep 22 20:18 libglide-webp.so\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup 256K Sep 22 20:18 libhttpdns.so\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup 1.2M Sep 22 20:18 libhydeviceid.so\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup 252K Sep 22 20:18 libnms.so\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup 275K Sep 22 20:18 libnrb.so\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup 167K Sep 22 20:18 libqmp.so\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup  93K Sep 22 20:18 libqsealib.so\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup 331K Sep 22 20:18 librmonitor_base.so\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup 223K Sep 22 20:18 librmonitor_memory.so\n", "stderr": ""}"}
*

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && strings lib/arm64-v8a/*.so | grep -iE \"(version|openssl|crypto|curl|webkit|okhttp|webview)\" | sort -u | head -40"}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "  Based on Apple LLVM version 5.0.0 (clang-1001.0.46.3) (http://git.code.oa.com/SecurityResearchProject/ANTI-Reverse.git d62476380297104a7b6c3b2ffb4b9750404ce028)\n  Based on Apple LLVM version 5.0.0 (clang-1001.0.46.3) (http://git.code.oa.com/SecurityResearchProject/ANTI-Reverse.git d71df9fb3d3c190e12143e53607417546aec9b55)\n%s version %s %s (%s)\n.*libjavacrypto\\.so$\n.bugly_version\n.gnu.version\n.gnu.version_r\n/proc/version\n: no conversion\nAndroid (10552028, +pgo, +bolt, +lto, -mlgo, based on r487747d) clang version 17.0.2 (https://android.googlesource.com/toolchain/llvm-project d9f89f4d16663d5012e5c09495f3b30ece3d2362)\nAndroid (4751641 based on r328903) clang version 7.0.2 (https://android.googlesource.com/toolchain/clang 003100370607242ddd5815e4a043907ea9004281) (https://android.googlesource.com/toolchain/llvm 1d739ffb0366421d383e04ff80ec2ee591315116) (based on LLVM 7.0.2svn)\nAndroid (5220042 based on r346389c) clang version 8.0.7 (https://android.googlesource.com/toolchain/clang b55f2d4ebfd35bf643d27dbca1bb228957008617) (https://android.googlesource.com/toolchain/llvm 3c393fe7a7e13b0fba4ac75a01aa683d7a5b11cd) (based on LLVM 8.0.7svn)\nAndroid (5900059 based on r365631c) clang version 9.0.8 (https://android.googlesource.com/toolchain/llvm-project 207d7abc1a2abf3ef8d4301736d6a7ebc224a290) (based on LLVM 9.0.8svn)\nAndroid (6454773 based on r365631c2) clang version 9.0.8 (https://android.googlesource.com/toolchain/llvm-project 98c855489587874b2a325e7a516b99d838599c6f) (based on LLVM 9.0.8svn)\nAndroid (7019983 based on r365631c3) clang version 9.0.9 (https://android.googlesource.com/toolchain/llvm-project a2a1e703c0edb03ba29944e529ccbf457742737b) (based on LLVM 9.0.9svn)\nAndroid (8490178, based on r450784d) clang version 14.0.6 (https://android.googlesource.com/toolchain/llvm-project 4c603efb0cca074e9238af8b4106c30add4418f6)\nAndroid (dev based on r365631c3) clang version 9.0.9 (https://android.googlesource.com/toolchain/llvm-project e513ca510fed5db9e7dc030f9eb7ff3b258773b5) (based on Obfuscator-LLVM 9.0.9svn)\nAndroid clang version 5.0.300080  (based on LLVM 5.0.300080)\nApp version: '%s'\nAppVersion\nApple LLVM version 10.0.1 (clang-1001.0.46.3)\nBUGLY_VERSION_SESSION\nBugly NDK version:%s\nCIE version is not 1 or 3\nGot CIE version %u, expected version 1 or 3\nIt's not a valid .ARM.attributes section for version(%d) is not 0x41.\nJAR_JNI_VERSION\nMSSDKVersion\nMSSDKVersionCode\nN12_GLOBAL__N_116itanium_demangle14ConversionExprE\nN12_GLOBAL__N_116itanium_demangle22ConversionOperatorTypeE\nN12_GLOBAL__N_116itanium_demangle29PointerToMemberConversionExprE\nOSVersion\nPrimitive char conversion on invalid type \nSO version is: %s\nSet native info: app version(%s)\nUnrecognized version number in \nWebPGetDecoderVersion\nWebPGetDemuxVersion\n_Z12getOsVersionv\n", "stderr": ""}"}

Call TodoWrite

Arguments
{"todos": [{"content": "Extract and analyze APK structure and components", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Extracting and analyzing APK structure"}, {"content": "Identify libraries, dependencies, and versions", "status": "in_progress", "activeForm": "Identifying libraries and versions"}, {"content": "Search for known CVEs in identified components", "status": "pending", "activeForm": "Searching for known CVEs"}, {"content": "Decompile and analyze code for CVE confirmation", "status": "pending", "activeForm": "Decompiling and analyzing code"}, {"content": "Verify each CVE existence through code analysis", "status": "pending", "activeForm": "Verifying CVE existence"}, {"content": "Generate vulnerability assessment report", "status": "pending", "activeForm": "Generating assessment report"}]}

Tool result
Todos have been modified successfully. Ensure that you continue to use the todo list to track your progress. Please proceed with the current tasks if applicable

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && file lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so && strings lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so | grep -i \"webp\" | head -10"}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so: ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, ARM aarch64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, BuildID[sha1]=7ed498a7a6f143aef8d6185a054ef00528815e57, for Android 21, built by NDK r16b (4479499), stripped\nWebPDecode\nWebPDemuxDelete\nWebPDemuxGetFrame\nWebPDemuxGetI\nWebPDemuxInternal\nWebPDemuxNextFrame\nWebPDemuxReleaseIterator\nWebPGetFeaturesInternal\nWebPGetInfo\nWebPInitDecoderConfigInternal\n", "stderr": ""}"}

Call WebSearch

Arguments
{"query": "libwebp CVE vulnerabilities 2023 2024"}

Tool result
Web search results for query: "libwebp CVE vulnerabilities 2023 2024"

Links: [{"title":"CVE-2023-4863: Understanding the libwebp Vulnerability in the Cloud | Orca Security","url":"https://orca.security/resources/blog/understanding-libwebp-vulnerability/"},{"title":"Critical WebP 0-day Vuln CVE-2023-4863 in libwebp Impacts Wider Software Ecosystem | Snyk","url":"https://snyk.io/blog/critical-webp-0-day-cve-2023-4863/"},{"title":"Critical Zero-Day Vulnerability in 'libwebp': CVE-2023-4863 ...","url":"https://socradar.io/critical-zero-day-vulnerability-in-libwebp-cve-2023-4863-reassigned-as-cve-2023-5129/"},{"title":"Uncovering the Hidden WebP vulnerability: a tale of a CVE with much bigger implications than it originally seemed","url":"https://blog.cloudflare.com/uncovering-the-hidden-webp-vulnerability-cve-2023-4863/"},{"title":"Guidance on the Recent Critical libwebp and libvpx Vulnerabilities | Akamai","url":"https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/guidance-on-critical-chrome-vulnerabilities-libwebp-and-libvpx"},{"title":"Zero Day WebP vulnerability (CVE-2023–4863) | by vsociety | Medium","url":"https://vsociety.medium.com/zero-day-webp-vulnerability-cve-2023-4863-1e5085ec8241"},{"title":"Watch out! CVE-2023-5129 in libwebp library affects millions apps","url":"https://securityaffairs.com/151576/hacking/cve-2023-5129-libwebp-flaw.html"},{"title":"CVE-2023-4863: Heap buffer overflow in Google libwebp (WebP)","url":"https://www.tarlogic.com/blog/cve-2023-4863/"},{"title":"What is CVE-2023-4863? Google's libwebp at risk | UpGuard","url":"https://www.upguard.com/blog/libwebp-cve-2023"},{"title":"CVE-2023-41064, CVE-2023-4863, CVE-2023-5129: Frequently Asked Questions for ImageIO and WebP/libwebp Zero-Day Vulnerabilities - Blog | Tenable®","url":"https://www.tenable.com/blog/cve-2023-41064-cve-2023-4863-cve-2023-5129-faq-imageio-webp-zero-days"}]

Based on the search results, here's what I found regarding libwebp CVE vulnerabilities in 2023 and 2024:

Major CVE-2023-4863 Vulnerability (2023)

On September 11th, 2023, Google published an update for Chrome that fixed CVE-2023-4863, "Heap Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in WebP." This turned out to be a critical zero-day vulnerability actively exploited in the wild.

Key Details:

  • Severity: CVE-2023-4863 was opened on September 11th, 2023 with a CVSS score of 9.6 (originally 8.8, later increased)
  • Root Cause: The vulnerability affects the libwebp image library used for rendering images in WebP format, specifically stemming from the Huffman coding algorithm
  • Affected Versions: All versions before 1.3.2

CVE Confusion:

There was significant confusion around the CVE identifiers. On September 25th, Google published a new CVE, CVE-2023-5129, which covered libwebp. Confusingly, Google then rejected their own, new CVE as a duplicate of CVE-2023-4863 and added libwebp to the original CVE.(no content)Google also assigned a maximum CVSSv3 score of 10.0 for this CVE before rejecting it as a duplicate.

Connection to Apple Vulnerability:

There were speculations of it being linked to the CVE-2023-41064 vulnerability affecting Apple products, due to both being the same issue with BuildHuffmanTable.

Impact:

It turned out to be a bug deeply rooted in the libwebp library, which is not only used by Chrome but by virtually every application that handles WebP images.(no content)The issue potentially affects millions of different applications worldwide.

Exploitation:

This vulnerability was discovered by Clément Lecigne of Google's Threat Analysis Group. This vulnerability was also used by a commercial surveillance vendor.

Based on the search results, CVE-2023-4863 appears to be the primary libwebp vulnerability from this time period, with no distinct 2024 vulnerabilities mentioned in the results.

Call WebFetch

Arguments
{"url": "https://orca.security/resources/blog/understanding-libwebp-vulnerability/", "prompt": "Extract technical details about CVE-2023-4863 including affected libwebp versions, the vulnerable function name, patch version, and how to identify if a binary is vulnerable"}

Tool result
# CVE-2023-4863 Technical Details

Based on the provided article, here are the technical specifics available:

Affected Versions

"libwebp, all versions before 1.3.2" are vulnerable to this heap buffer overflow.

Vulnerability Classification

The article describes this as a "Heap Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in WebP" that affects the libwebp codec library used for processing Google's WebP image format.

Vulnerable Function

The document does not specify the particular vulnerable function name within libwebp.

Attack Vector

"The primary risk from CVE-2023-4863 is through interactive browsing" where "sources have publicly acknowledged active exploitation." The vulnerability is characterized as a zero-click exploit in image processing.

Identification Method

Orca customers can "identify workloads that contain a vulnerable version of libwebp via Discovery or the Vulnerabilities Security View" using the Orca Cloud Security Platform.

Mitigation

The article explicitly states: "As of now, there are no available mitigations. Update libwebp and any applications or services that use a vulnerable version."

Note: The article lacks detailed technical specifications about the specific vulnerable function or in-depth patch analysis. For comprehensive technical details, consulting the official CVE database or Google's security advisories would be necessary.

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && hexdump -C lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so | grep -i \"1\\\\.3\\\\|1\\\\.2\\\\|1\\\\.1\\\\|1\\\\.0\\\\|0\\\\.\" | head -20"}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "", "stderr": "/bin/bash: line 1: hexdump: command not found\n"}"}

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && strings lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so | grep -E \"^[0-9]+\\.[0-9]+\\.[0-9]+$|WebP.*version|libwebp\""}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 1, "stdout": "", "stderr": ""}"}

Call ghidra_open_server

Arguments
{"filepath": "/sandbox/lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so"}

Tool result
[object Object]

Call ghidra_search_functions_by_name

Arguments
{"filepath": "/sandbox/lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so", "query": "Huffman"}

Tool result
{"result":["VP8LBuildHuffmanTable @ 001086b0","VP8LBuildHuffmanTable @ 0013b02c"]}

Call ghidra_decompile_function

Arguments
{"filepath": "/sandbox/lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so", "name_or_address": "0x001086b0"}

Tool result
{"result":"\nvoid VP8LBuildHuffmanTable(void)\n\n{\n  (*(code *)PTR_VP8LBuildHuffmanTable_0015d7d8)();\n  return;\n}\n\n"}

Call ghidra_decompile_function

Arguments
{"filepath": "/sandbox/lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so", "name_or_address": "0x0013b02c"}

Tool result
{"result":"\nvoid * VP8LBuildHuffmanTable(long param_1,undefined4 param_2,undefined8 param_3,int param_4)\n\n{\n  long lVar1;\n  void *__ptr;\n  ulong uVar2;\n  undefined1 *puVar3;\n  undefined1 auStack_458 [1024];\n  long local_58;\n  \n  lVar1 = tpidr_el0;\n  local_58 = *(long *)(lVar1 + 0x28);\n  if (param_1 == 0) {\n    puVar3 = (undefined1 *)0x0;\nLAB_0013b098:\n    __ptr = (void *)FUN_0013b11c(param_1,param_2,param_3,param_4,puVar3);\n  }\n  else {\n    if (param_4 < 0x201) {\n      puVar3 = auStack_458;\n      goto LAB_0013b098;\n    }\n    __ptr = (void *)WebPSafeMalloc((long)param_4,2);\n    if (__ptr != (void )0x0) {\n      uVar2 = FUN_0013b11c(param_1,param_2,param_3,param_4,__ptr);\n      WebPSafeFree(__ptr);\n      if ((long *)(lVar1 + 0x28) == local_58) {\n        return (void )(uVar2 & 0xffffffff);\n      }\n      goto LAB_0013b118;\n    }\n  }\n  if ((long )(lVar1 + 0x28) == local_58) {\n    return __ptr;\n  }\nLAB_0013b118:\n                    / WARNING: Subroutine does not return /\n  __stack_chk_fail();\n}\n\n"}

Call TodoWrite

Arguments
{"todos": [{"content": "Extract and analyze APK structure and components", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Extracting and analyzing APK structure"}, {"content": "Identify libraries, dependencies, and versions", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Identifying libraries and versions"}, {"content": "Search for known CVEs in identified components", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Searching for known CVEs"}, {"content": "Decompile and analyze code for CVE confirmation", "status": "in_progress", "activeForm": "Decompiling and analyzing code"}, {"content": "Verify each CVE existence through code analysis", "status": "pending", "activeForm": "Verifying CVE existence"}, {"content": "Generate vulnerability assessment report", "status": "pending", "activeForm": "Generating assessment report"}]}

Tool result
Todos have been modified successfully. Ensure that you continue to use the todo list to track your progress. Please proceed with the current tasks if applicable

Call WebFetch

Arguments
{"url": "https://www.tarlogic.com/blog/cve-2023-4863/", "prompt": "Extract the specific vulnerable function name, the exact code location of the vulnerability, affected libwebp versions, patched version, and the technical details of the heap buffer overflow in BuildHuffmanTable"}

Tool result
# CVE-2023-4863 Technical Analysis

Vulnerable Function

BuildHuffmanTable - The function responsible for validating input data in the Libwebp library.

Vulnerability Location

The vulnerability exists in the open-source Libwebp library, specifically within the BuildHuffmanTable function used for WebP image processing.

Technical Details

The core issue involves improper memory allocation. When processing a malicious WebP image, the BuildHuffmanTable function "allocates extra memory if the existing table is not large enough for the input data," enabling attackers to write arbitrary data beyond established memory boundaries. This results in a heap buffer overflow condition.

Impact

This memory corruption allows for arbitrary code execution when a specially crafted WebP file is processed.

Affected & Patched Versions

The webpage provides a mitigation table listing specific fixed versions for various products:

  • Google Chrome: Ver. 116.0.5845.187 and later
  • Mozilla Firefox: Ver. 117.0.1 and later
  • Microsoft Edge: Ver. 116.0.1938.81 and later
  • Thunderbird: Ver. 102.15.1 / 115.2.2 and later

The document does not specify unpatched Libwebp version numbers explicitly, only noting that versions "lower versions than the listed" are affected.

CVSS Score

8.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

Call ghidra_search_functions_by_name

Arguments
{"filepath": "/sandbox/lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so", "query": "WebP", "limit": 50}

Tool result
{"result":["WebPAllocateDecBuffer @ 00108c30","WebPAllocateDecBuffer @ 0011e924","WebPAvoidSlowMemory @ 00108660","WebPAvoidSlowMemory @ 0011f038","WebPConvertARGBToUV_C @ 00108dd0","WebPConvertARGBToUV_C @ 001358a4","WebPConvertRGBA32ToUV_C @ 00135a90","WebPCopyDecBuffer @ 001089a0","WebPCopyDecBuffer @ 0011eca8","WebPCopyDecBufferPixels @ 001087c0","WebPCopyDecBufferPixels @ 0011ed3c","WebPCopyPixels @ 0011e660","WebPCopyPlane @ 00108990","WebPCopyPlane @ 0011e5f4","WebPDeallocateAlphaMemory @ 001089d0","WebPDeallocateAlphaMemory @ 0013bb74","WebPDecode @ 00108be0","WebPDecode @ 0011cbc4","WebPDecodeARGB @ 0011c60c","WebPDecodeARGBInto @ 0011be68","WebPDecodeBGR @ 0011c718","WebPDecodeBGRA @ 0011c824","WebPDecodeBGRAInto @ 0011c010","WebPDecodeBGRInto @ 0011bf3c","WebPDecodeRGB @ 0011c3f8","WebPDecodeRGBA @ 0011c500","WebPDecodeRGBAInto @ 0011bd98","WebPDecodeRGBInto @ 0011bcc8","WebPDecodeYUV @ 0011c930","WebPDecodeYUVInto @ 0011c0e4","WebPDemuxDelete @ 0011d284","WebPDemuxGetChunk @ 0011d4c4","WebPDemuxGetFrame @ 00108df0","WebPDemuxGetFrame @ 0011d340","WebPDemuxGetI @ 00108630","WebPDemuxGetI @ 0011d2e4","WebPDemuxInternal @ 00108750","WebPDemuxInternal @ 0011cf18","WebPDemuxNextChunk @ 0011d5a8","WebPDemuxNextFrame @ 00108920","WebPDemuxNextFrame @ 0011d47c","WebPDemuxPrevChunk @ 0011d69c","WebPDemuxPrevFrame @ 0011d498","WebPDemuxReleaseChunkIterator @ 0011d78c","WebPDemuxReleaseIterator @ 00108970","WebPDemuxReleaseIterator @ 0011d4c0","WebPDequantizeLevels @ 00108b60","WebPDequantizeLevels @ 0013d2c0","WebPFlipBuffer @ 00108790","WebPFlipBuffer @ 0011e870"]}

Call ghidra_list_methods

Arguments
{"filepath": "/sandbox/lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so", "limit": 200}

Tool result
{"result":["FUN_00108490 @ 00108490","VP8LCheckSignature @ 001084b0","VP8LDecodeAlphaHeader @ 001084c0","WebPRescalerDspInit @ 001084d0","_Unwind_GetDataRelBase @ 001084e0","WebPInitConvertARGBToYUV @ 001084f0","pthread_mutex_destroy @ 00108500","_Unwind_Find_FDE @ 00108510","VP8GetHeaders @ 00108520","pthread_create @ 00108530","WebPInitSharpYUVNEON @ 00108540","VP8LColorIndexInverseTransformAlpha @ 00108550","VP8DecodeMB @ 00108560","pthread_join @ 00108570","VP8LInverseTransform @ 00108580","realloc @ 00108590","VP8InitClipTables @ 001085a0","__google_potentially_blocking_region_begin @ 001085b0","pthread_key_create @ 001085c0","VP8EnterCritical @ 001085d0","pthread_once @ 001085e0","__cxa_finalize @ 001085f0","WebPRescalerGetScaledDimensions @ 00108600","__deregister_frame_info @ 00108610","WebPMultARGBRows @ 00108620","WebPDemuxGetI @ 00108630","VP8New @ 00108640","_Unwind_SetGR @ 00108650","WebPAvoidSlowMemory @ 00108660","VP8LDelete @ 00108670","VP8InitFrame @ 00108680","calloc @ 00108690","WebPSafeFree @ 001086a0","VP8LBuildHuffmanTable @ 001086b0","__google_potentially_blocking_region_end @ 001086c0","pthread_cond_destroy @ 001086d0","VP8GetValue @ 001086e0","WebPInitConvertARGBToYUVNEON @ 001086f0","strncmp @ 00108700","VP8ExitCritical @ 00108710","_Unwind_GetIPInfo @ 00108720","WebPRescalerExportRow @ 00108730","_Unwind_GetLanguageSpecificData @ 00108740","WebPDemuxInternal @ 00108750","operator= @ 00108760","VP8LDecodeHeader @ 00108770","pthread_mutex_init @ 00108780","WebPFlipBuffer @ 00108790","VP8ParseProba @ 001087a0","VP8InitIoInternal @ 001087b0","WebPCopyDecBufferPixels @ 001087c0","WebPGetFeaturesInternal @ 001087d0","VP8LGetInfo @ 001087e0","_Unwind_DeleteException @ 001087f0","VP8InitBitReader @ 00108800","WebPInitUpsamplers @ 00108810","pthread_cond_init @ 00108820","abort @ 00108830","VP8LDoFillBitWindow @ 00108840","vsnprintf @ 00108850","VP8LConvertBGRAToBGR_C @ 00108860","VP8LTransformColorInverse_C @ 00108870","strerror @ 00108880","WebPRescaleNeededLines @ 00108890","WebPInitSamplers @ 001088a0","VP8LConvertFromBGRA @ 001088b0","VP8ProcessRow @ 001088c0","VP8InitScanline @ 001088d0","VP8SetError @ 001088e0","VP8InitDithering @ 001088f0","dl_iterate_phdr @ 00108900","VP8DspInitNEON @ 00108910","WebPDemuxNextFrame @ 00108920","VP8LDspInitNEON @ 00108930","write @ 00108940","WebPRescalerImportRow @ 00108950","__deregister_frame_info_bases @ 00108960","WebPDemuxReleaseIterator @ 00108970","_M_range_insert<signed_char*> @ 00108980","WebPCopyPlane @ 00108990","WebPCopyDecBuffer @ 001089a0","memcmp @ 001089b0","VP8ResetProba @ 001089c0","WebPDeallocateAlphaMemory @ 001089d0","_Unwind_Resume_or_Rethrow @ 001089e0","fputs @ 001089f0","VP8Delete @ 00108a00","fputc @ 00108a10","VP8LClear @ 00108a20","__stack_chk_fail @ 00108a30","VP8ParseIntraModeRow @ 00108a40","VP8FiltersInitNEON @ 00108a50","VP8DecompressAlphaRows @ 00108a60","VP8GetSignedValue @ 00108a70","VP8LColorCacheInit @ 00108a80","__register_frame_info @ 00108a90","VP8LNew @ 00108aa0","WebPGetInfo @ 00108ab0","VP8LoadFinalBytes @ 00108ac0","WebPFreeDecBuffer @ 00108ad0","WebPInitDecoderConfigInternal @ 00108ae0","pthread_key_delete @ 00108af0","pthread_cond_wait @ 00108b00","WebPInitDecBufferInternal @ 00108b10","WebPSafeCalloc @ 00108b20","VP8LDspInit @ 00108b30","VP8LConvertBGRAToRGBA_C @ 00108b40","VP8LInitBitReader @ 00108b50","WebPDequantizeLevels @ 00108b60","pthread_setspecific @ 00108b70","AndroidBitmap_getInfo @ 00108b80","AndroidBitmap_lockPixels @ 00108b90","VP8FiltersInit @ 00108ba0","__android_log_print @ 00108bb0","VP8LAddGreenToBlueAndRed_C @ 00108bc0","__register_frame_info_table @ 00108bd0","WebPDecode @ 00108be0","WebPSamplerProcessPlane @ 00108bf0","WebPMultRows @ 00108c00","WebPRescalerExport @ 00108c10","_Unwind_RaiseException @ 00108c20","WebPAllocateDecBuffer @ 00108c30","AndroidBitmap_unlockPixels @ 00108c40","strcmp @ 00108c50","_Unwind_SetIP @ 00108c60","VP8LColorCacheClear @ 00108c70","syscall @ 00108c80","sprintf @ 00108c90","__register_frame_info_bases @ 00108ca0","_Unwind_GetRegionStart @ 00108cb0","pthread_mutex_lock @ 00108cc0","VP8ParseQuant @ 00108cd0","WebPInitAlphaProcessing @ 00108ce0","pthread_getspecific @ 00108cf0","_Unwind_GetTextRelBase @ 00108d00","memmove @ 00108d10","__enable_shared_from_this_helper<(__gnu_cxx::_Lock_policy)2> @ 00108d20","VP8LColorCacheCopy @ 00108d30","WebPRescalerInit @ 00108d40","_Unwind_GetCFA @ 00108d50","WebPInitCustomIo @ 00108d60","WebPIoInitFromOptions @ 00108d70","WebPInitUpsamplersNEON @ 00108d80","VP8DspInit @ 00108d90","VP8Decode @ 00108da0","VP8GetThreadMethod @ 00108db0","strlen @ 00108dc0","WebPConvertARGBToUV_C @ 00108dd0","WebPRescalerImport @ 00108de0","WebPDemuxGetFrame @ 00108df0","VP8InitRandom @ 00108e00","malloc @ 00108e10","WebPRescalerDspInitNEON @ 00108e20","VP8GetInfo @ 00108e30","memcpy @ 00108e40","VP8LHtreeGroupsFree @ 00108e50","_Unwind_Resume @ 00108e60","WebPSafeMalloc @ 00108e70","VP8LConvertBGRAToRGB_C @ 00108e80","VP8LDecodeAlphaImageStream @ 00108e90","memset @ 00108ea0","VP8LReadBits @ 00108eb0","WebPInitAlphaProcessingNEON @ 00108ec0","VP8LHtreeGroupsNew @ 00108ed0","fwrite @ 00108ee0","free @ 00108ef0","__register_frame_info_table_bases @ 00108f00","WebPGetWorkerInterface @ 00108f10","WebPInitYUV444Converters @ 00108f20","pthread_cond_signal @ 00108f30","VP8LDecodeImage @ 00108f40","pthread_mutex_unlock @ 00108f50","__cxa_atexit @ 00108f60","entry @ 00108f70","_INIT_0 @ 00108f7c","_INIT_1 @ 00108fc8","_INIT_2 @ 00108fe0","FUN_00109040 @ 00109040","FUN_00109120 @ 00109120","FUN_00109200 @ 00109200","FUN_00109244 @ 00109244","FUN_00109250 @ 00109250","FUN_0010925c @ 0010925c","operator= @ 001097c4","FUN_001098cc @ 001098cc","FUN_0010996c @ 0010996c","FUN_00109a84 @ 00109a84","FUN_00109c58 @ 00109c58","FUN_00109fac @ 00109fac","FUN_0010a0e0 @ 0010a0e0","FUN_0010a198 @ 0010a198","FUN_0010a22c @ 0010a22c","FUN_0010a2c0 @ 0010a2c0","FUN_0010a584 @ 0010a584","FUN_0010a640 @ 0010a640","FUN_0010a6fc @ 0010a6fc","FUN_0010a8a0 @ 0010a8a0","FUN_0010a940 @ 0010a940","FUN_0010ab84 @ 0010ab84","JNI_OnLoad @ 0010accc"]}
*

Call ghidra_get_xrefs_to

Arguments
{"filepath": "/sandbox/lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so", "address": "0x0013b02c"}

Tool result
{"result":["From Entry Point [EXTERNAL]","From 0015d7d8 [DATA]","From 001086bc in VP8LBuildHuffmanTable [COMPUTED_CALL]","From 00145ca0 [INDIRECTION]","From 0014a4c8 [DATA]"]}

Call WebSearch

Arguments
{"query": "CVE-2023-4863 libwebp BuildHuffmanTable patch commit github diff"}

Tool result
Web search results for query: "CVE-2023-4863 libwebp BuildHuffmanTable patch commit github diff"

Links: [{"title":"libwebp: OOB write in BuildHuffmanTable · CVE-2023-4863 · GitHub Advisory Database · GitHub","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j7hp-h8jx-5ppr"},{"title":"CVE-2023-4863: libwebp: OOB write in BuildHuffmanTable","url":"https://www.miggo.io/vulnerability-database/cve/CVE-2023-4863"},{"title":"Resolving Webp Zero-day Vulnerability CVE-2023-4863 | Veracode","url":"https://www.veracode.com/blog/resolving-webp-zero-day-vulnerability-cve-2023-4863/"},{"title":"oss-sec: CVE-2023-4863: libwebp: Heap buffer overflow in WebP Codec","url":"https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2023/q3/204"},{"title":"NVD - cve-2023-4863","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2023-4863"},{"title":"Critical Vulnerability: WebP Heap Buffer Overflow (CVE-2023-4863) | Huntress","url":"https://www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerability-webp-heap-buffer-overflow-cve-2023-4863"},{"title":"Exploiting the libwebp Vulnerability, Part 1: Playing with Huffman Code | DARKNAVY","url":"https://www.darknavy.org/blog/exploiting_the_libwebp_vulnerability_part_1/"},{"title":"oss-security - CVE-2023-4863: libwebp: Heap buffer overflow in WebP Codec","url":"https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/09/21/4"},{"title":"How to find and fix Critical WebP zero-day vulnerability CVE-2023-4863 | Snyk","url":"https://snyk.io/blog/find-and-fix-webp-vulnerability-cve-2023-4863/"},{"title":"Critical Zero-Day Vulnerability in 'libwebp': CVE-2023-4863 ...","url":"https://socradar.io/critical-zero-day-vulnerability-in-libwebp-cve-2023-4863-reassigned-as-cve-2023-5129/"}]

Based on the search results, I found information about CVE-2023-4863, the libwebp BuildHuffmanTable vulnerability, and the patch commit. Here's what I discovered:

CVE-2023-4863 Overview

CVE-2023-4863 is a heap buffer overflow in libwebp that allows a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.(no content)The vulnerability is specifically an OOB (out-of-bounds) write in BuildHuffmanTable.

Patch Commit Details

The main patch commit is 2af26267cdfcb63a88e5c74a85927a12d6ca1776 (cherry-picked from commit 902bc9190331343b2017211debcec8d2ab87e17a) by Vincent Rabaud, dated September 7, 2023, which fixes the OOB write in BuildHuffmanTable.(no content)The fix works by first calling BuildHuffmanTable to check if the data is valid, and if it is and the table is not big enough, more memory is allocated, ensuring that valid but unoptimized streams with unbalanced codes are still decodable.

GitHub Diff

The search results include a diff showing the patch changes. The patch adds bounds checking in two files: vp8l_dec.c adds a bound calculation, and huffman_utils.c adds a bounds check before writing to the table. The key addition in huffman_utils.c checks whether writing to the table would exceed the allocated bounds before proceeding.

The vulnerability was fixed in libwebp version 1.3.2, released on September 13, 2023.

Call WebFetch

Arguments
{"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j7hp-h8jx-5ppr", "prompt": "Extract the vulnerable code snippet, patched code snippet, exact affected versions, patched version numbers, and commit hash for the fix"}

Tool result
# CVE-2023-4863 Analysis

Vulnerability Summary

A heap buffer overflow in libwebp's BuildHuffmanTable function allows out-of-bounds memory writes via crafted HTML pages.

Affected Versions & Patches

EcosystemPackageVulnerablePatched
pipPillow< 10.0.110.0.1
npmelectron22.0.0–22.3.23, 24.0.0–24.8.2, 25.0.0–25.8.0, 26.0.0–26.2.0, 27.0.0-beta.122.3.24, 24.8.3, 25.8.1, 26.2.1, 27.0.0-beta.2
Rust cargolibwebp-sys< 0.9.30.9.3
Rust cargowebp< 0.2.60.2.6
NuGetSkiaSharp2.0.0–2.88.52.88.6

Key References

Upstream Fix: webmproject/libwebp@902bc91
Rust Wrapper Fix: qnighy/libwebp-sys2-rs@4560c47
Release: "libwebp v1.3.2" contains the security patch

Code Details

The page content does not include the actual vulnerable or patched code snippets—only references to commits and external resources. The vulnerability exists in the "BuildHuffmanTable" function where boundary checks fail during webp decoding.

Attack Vector: Network-based; requires user interaction to view a crafted HTML page containing malicious WebP image data.

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && git clone --depth 1 --branch v1.3.1 https://chromium.googlesource.com/webm/libwebp 2>&1 | head -20"}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "Cloning into 'libwebp'...\nwarning: refs/tags/v1.3.1 1b2b059ab896ce5f072ecc739e02edb444a96d7a is not a commit!\nNote: switching to 'fd7bb21c0cb56e8a82e9bfa376164b842f433f3b'.\n\nYou are in 'detached HEAD' state. You can look around, make experimental\nchanges and commit them, and you can discard any commits you make in this\nstate without impacting any branches by switching back to a branch.\n\nIf you want to create a new branch to retain commits you create, you may\ndo so (now or later) by using -c with the switch command. Example:\n\n  git switch -c \n\nOr undo this operation with:\n\n  git switch -\n\nTurn off this advice by setting config variable advice.detachedHead to false\n\nUpdating files:   2% (8/329)\rUpdating files:   3% (10/329)\rUpdating files:   4% (14/329)\rUpdating files:   5% (17/329)\rUpdating files:   6% (20/329)\rUpdating files:   6% (21/329)\rUpdating files:   7% (24/329)\rUpdating files:   7% (26/329)\rUpdating files:   8% (27/329)\rUpdating files:   9% (30/329)\rUpdating files:   9% (31/329)\rUpdating files:  10% (33/329)\rUpdating files:  10% (36/329)\rUpdating files:  11% (37/329)\rUpdating files:  12% (40/329)\rUpdating files:  12% (42/329)\rUpdating files:  13% (43/329)\rUpdating files:  14% (47/329)\rUpdating files:  15% (50/329)\rUpdating files:  16% (53/329)\rUpdating files:  17% (56/329)\rUpdating files:  17% (58/329)\rUpdating files:  18% (60/329)\rUpdating files:  19% (63/329)\rUpdating files:  20% (66/329)\rUpdating files:  20% (68/329)\rUpdating files:  21% (70/329)\rUpdating files:  22% (73/329)\rUpdating files:  23% (76/329)\rUpdating files:  23% (78/329)\rUpdating files:  24% (79/329)\rUpdating files:  25% (83/329)\rUpdating files:  25% (84/329)\rUpdating files:  26% (86/329)\rUpdating files:  27% (89/329)\rUpdating files:  27% (90/329)\rUpdating files:  28% (93/329)\rUpdating files:  28% (95/329)\rUpdating files:  29% (96/329)\rUpdating files:  30% (99/329)\rUpdating files:  30% (100/329)\rUpdating files:  31% (102/329)\rUpdating files:  31% (105/329)\rUpdating files:  32% (106/329)\rUpdating files:  33% (109/329)\rUpdating files:  33% (110/329)\rUpdating files:  34% (112/329)\rUpdating files:  34% (115/329)\rUpdating files:  35% (116/329)\rUpdating files:  36% (119/329)\rUpdating files:  36% (121/329)\rUpdating files:  37% (122/329)\rUpdating files:  38% (126/329)\rUpdating files:  39% (129/329)\rUpdating files:  39% (131/329)\rUpdating files:  40% (132/329)\rUpdating files:  41% (135/329)\rUpdating files:  41% (136/329)\rUpdating files:  42% (139/329)\rUpdating files:  43% (142/329)\rUpdating files:  44% (145/329)\rUpdating files:  44% (147/329)\rUpdating files:  45% (149/329)\rUpdating files:  45% (151/329)\rUpdating files:  46% (152/329)\rUpdating files:  47% (155/329)\rUpdating files:  47% (157/329)\rUpdating files:  48% (158/329)\rUpdating files:  49% (162/329)\rUpdating files:  50% (165/329)\rUpdating files:  51% (168/329)\rUpdating files:  52% (172/329)\rUpdating files:  52% (173/329)\rUpdating files:  53% (175/329)\rUpdating files:  54% (178/329)\rUpdating files:  54% (179/329)\rUpdating files:  55% (181/329)\rUpdating files:  55% (184/329)\rUpdating files:  56% (185/329)\rUpdating files:  57% (188/329)\rUpdating files:  57% (190/329)\rUpdating files:  58% (191/329)\rUpdating files:  59% (195/329)\rUpdating files:  60% (198/329)\rUpdating files:  61% (201/329)\rUpdating files:  62% (204/329)\rUpdating files:  62% (206/329)\rUpdating files:  63% (208/329)\rUpdating files:  64% (211/329)\rUpdating files:  64% (212/329)\rUpdating files:  65% (214/329)\rUpdating files:  65% (217/329)\rUpdating files:  66% (218/329)\rUpdating files:  67% (221/329)\rUpdating files:  67% (223/329)\rUpdating files:  68% (224/329)\rUpdating files:  69% (228/329)\rUpdating files:  70% (231/329)\rUpdating files:  70% (233/329)\rUpdating files:  71% (234/329)\rUpdating files:  72% (237/329)\rUpdating files:  72% (238/329)\rUpdating files:  73% (241/329)\rUpdating files:  74% (244/329)\rUpdating files:  75% (247/329)\rUpdating files:  75% (250/329)\rUpdating files:  76% (251/329)\rUpdating files:  77% (254/329)\rUpdating files:  77% (255/329)\rUpdating files:  78% (257/329)\rUpdating files:  79% (260/329)\rUpdating files:  80% (264/329)\rUpdating files:  80% (265/329)\rUpdating files:  81% (267/329)\rUpdating files:  82% (270/329)\rUpdating files:  83% (274/329)\rUpdating files:  83% (276/329)\rUpdating files:  84% (277/329)\rUpdating files:  85% (280/329)\rUpdating files:  85% (281/329)\rUpdating files:  86% (283/329)\rUpdating files:  87% (287/329)\rUpdating files:  88% (290/329)\rUpdating files:  88% (292/329)\rUpdating files:  89% (293/329)\rUpdating files:  90% (297/329)\rUpdating files:  91% (300/329)\rUpdating files:  91% (302/329)\rUpdating files:  92% (303/329)\rUpdating files:  93% (306/329)\rUpdating files:  93% (307/329)\rUpdating files:  94% (310/329)\rUpdating files:  94% (311/329)\rUpdating files:  95% (313/329)\rUpdating files:  96% (316/329)\rUpdating files:  96% (317/329)\rUpdating files:  97% (320/329)\rUpdating files:  97% (322/329)\rUpdating files:  98% (323/329)\rUpdating files:  99% (326/329)\rUpdating files:  99% (327/329)\rUpdating files: 100% (329/329)\rUpdating files: 100% (329/329), done.\n", "stderr": ""}"}

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox/libwebp && cat src/utils/huffman_utils.c | grep -A 50 \"int BuildHuffmanTable\""}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "static int BuildHuffmanTable(HuffmanCode* const root_table, int root_bits,\n                             const int code_lengths[], int code_lengths_size,\n                             uint16_t sorted[]) {\n  HuffmanCode* table = root_table;  // next available space in table\n  int total_size = 1 << root_bits;  // total size root table + 2nd level table\n  int len;                          // current code length\n  int symbol;                       // symbol index in original or sorted table\n  // number of codes of each length:\n  int count[MAX_ALLOWED_CODE_LENGTH + 1] = { 0 };\n  // offsets in sorted table for each length:\n  int offset[MAX_ALLOWED_CODE_LENGTH + 1];\n\n  assert(code_lengths_size != 0);\n  assert(code_lengths != NULL);\n  assert((root_table != NULL && sorted != NULL) ||\n         (root_table == NULL && sorted == NULL));\n  assert(root_bits > 0);\n\n  // Build histogram of code lengths.\n  for (symbol = 0; symbol < code_lengths_size; ++symbol) {\n    if (code_lengths[symbol] > MAX_ALLOWED_CODE_LENGTH) {\n      return 0;\n    }\n    ++count[code_lengths[symbol]];\n  }\n\n  // Error, all code lengths are zeros.\n  if (count[0] == code_lengths_size) {\n    return 0;\n  }\n\n  // Generate offsets into sorted symbol table by code length.\n  offset[1] = 0;\n  for (len = 1; len < MAX_ALLOWED_CODE_LENGTH; ++len) {\n    if (count[len] > (1 << len)) {\n      return 0;\n    }\n    offset[len + 1] = offset[len] + count[len];\n  }\n\n  // Sort symbols by length, by symbol order within each length.\n  for (symbol = 0; symbol < code_lengths_size; ++symbol) {\n    const int symbol_code_length = code_lengths[symbol];\n    if (code_lengths[symbol] > 0) {\n      if (sorted != NULL) {\n        sorted[offset[symbol_code_length]++] = symbol;\n      } else {\n        offset[symbol_code_length]++;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n", "stderr": ""}"}

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && git clone --depth 1 --branch v1.3.2 https://chromium.googlesource.com/webm/libwebp libwebp-patched 2>&1 | tail -5"}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "  git switch -\n\nTurn off this advice by setting config variable advice.detachedHead to false\n\nUpdating files:   3% (10/329)\rUpdating files:   4% (14/329)\rUpdating files:   4% (16/329)\rUpdating files:   5% (17/329)\rUpdating files:   6% (20/329)\rUpdating files:   6% (23/329)\rUpdating files:   7% (24/329)\rUpdating files:   8% (27/329)\rUpdating files:   9% (30/329)\rUpdating files:  10% (33/329)\rUpdating files:  10% (36/329)\rUpdating files:  11% (37/329)\rUpdating files:  12% (40/329)\rUpdating files:  12% (42/329)\rUpdating files:  13% (43/329)\rUpdating files:  14% (47/329)\rUpdating files:  14% (49/329)\rUpdating files:  15% (50/329)\rUpdating files:  16% (53/329)\rUpdating files:  16% (55/329)\rUpdating files:  17% (56/329)\rUpdating files:  18% (60/329)\rUpdating files:  18% (61/329)\rUpdating files:  19% (63/329)\rUpdating files:  20% (66/329)\rUpdating files:  20% (67/329)\rUpdating files:  21% (70/329)\rUpdating files:  22% (73/329)\rUpdating files:  23% (76/329)\rUpdating files:  24% (79/329)\rUpdating files:  25% (83/329)\rUpdating files:  26% (86/329)\rUpdating files:  27% (89/329)\rUpdating files:  28% (93/329)\rUpdating files:  29% (96/329)\rUpdating files:  30% (99/329)\rUpdating files:  31% (102/329)\rUpdating files:  31% (105/329)\rUpdating files:  32% (106/329)\rUpdating files:  33% (109/329)\rUpdating files:  33% (111/329)\rUpdating files:  34% (112/329)\rUpdating files:  35% (116/329)\rUpdating files:  35% (118/329)\rUpdating files:  36% (119/329)\rUpdating files:  37% (122/329)\rUpdating files:  37% (124/329)\rUpdating files:  38% (126/329)\rUpdating files:  39% (129/329)\rUpdating files:  39% (130/329)\rUpdating files:  40% (132/329)\rUpdating files:  41% (135/329)\rUpdating files:  41% (136/329)\rUpdating files:  42% (139/329)\rUpdating files:  43% (142/329)\rUpdating files:  43% (143/329)\rUpdating files:  44% (145/329)\rUpdating files:  44% (148/329)\rUpdating files:  45% (149/329)\rUpdating files:  46% (152/329)\rUpdating files:  46% (154/329)\rUpdating files:  47% (155/329)\rUpdating files:  48% (158/329)\rUpdating files:  48% (161/329)\rUpdating files:  49% (162/329)\rUpdating files:  50% (165/329)\rUpdating files:  50% (167/329)\rUpdating files:  51% (168/329)\rUpdating files:  52% (172/329)\rUpdating files:  52% (173/329)\rUpdating files:  53% (175/329)\rUpdating files:  54% (178/329)\rUpdating files:  54% (180/329)\rUpdating files:  55% (181/329)\rUpdating files:  56% (185/329)\rUpdating files:  56% (186/329)\rUpdating files:  57% (188/329)\rUpdating files:  58% (191/329)\rUpdating files:  58% (193/329)\rUpdating files:  59% (195/329)\rUpdating files:  60% (198/329)\rUpdating files:  60% (199/329)\rUpdating files:  61% (201/329)\rUpdating files:  62% (204/329)\rUpdating files:  62% (205/329)\rUpdating files:  63% (208/329)\rUpdating files:  64% (211/329)\rUpdating files:  64% (212/329)\rUpdating files:  65% (214/329)\rUpdating files:  66% (218/329)\rUpdating files:  67% (221/329)\rUpdating files:  68% (224/329)\rUpdating files:  69% (228/329)\rUpdating files:  69% (230/329)\rUpdating files:  70% (231/329)\rUpdating files:  71% (234/329)\rUpdating files:  72% (237/329)\rUpdating files:  73% (241/329)\rUpdating files:  73% (243/329)\rUpdating files:  74% (244/329)\rUpdating files:  75% (247/329)\rUpdating files:  75% (250/329)\rUpdating files:  76% (251/329)\rUpdating files:  77% (254/329)\rUpdating files:  77% (256/329)\rUpdating files:  78% (257/329)\rUpdating files:  79% (260/329)\rUpdating files:  79% (262/329)\rUpdating files:  80% (264/329)\rUpdating files:  81% (267/329)\rUpdating files:  81% (268/329)\rUpdating files:  82% (270/329)\rUpdating files:  83% (274/329)\rUpdating files:  84% (277/329)\rUpdating files:  85% (280/329)\rUpdating files:  85% (281/329)\rUpdating files:  86% (283/329)\rUpdating files:  87% (287/329)\rUpdating files:  88% (290/329)\rUpdating files:  89% (293/329)\rUpdating files:  90% (297/329)\rUpdating files:  91% (300/329)\rUpdating files:  92% (303/329)\rUpdating files:  92% (305/329)\rUpdating files:  93% (306/329)\rUpdating files:  94% (310/329)\rUpdating files:  94% (311/329)\rUpdating files:  95% (313/329)\rUpdating files:  96% (316/329)\rUpdating files:  96% (317/329)\rUpdating files:  97% (320/329)\rUpdating files:  98% (323/329)\rUpdating files:  99% (326/329)\rUpdating files:  99% (327/329)\rUpdating files: 100% (329/329)\rUpdating files: 100% (329/329), done.\n", "stderr": ""}"}

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && diff -u libwebp/src/utils/huffman_utils.c libwebp-patched/src/utils/huffman_utils.c | head -100"}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "--- libwebp/src/utils/huffman_utils.c\t2025-10-31 18:58:25.614287730 +0000\n+++ libwebp-patched/src/utils/huffman_utils.c\t2025-10-31 18:59:55.367064253 +0000\n@@ -177,21 +177,24 @@\n       if (num_open < 0) {\n         return 0;\n       }\n-      if (root_table == NULL) continue;\n       for (; count[len] > 0; --count[len]) {\n         HuffmanCode code;\n         if ((key & mask) != low) {\n-          table += table_size;\n+          if (root_table != NULL) table += table_size;\n           table_bits = NextTableBitSize(count, len, root_bits);\n           table_size = 1 << table_bits;\n           total_size += table_size;\n           low = key & mask;\n-          root_table[low].bits = (uint8_t)(table_bits + root_bits);\n-          root_table[low].value = (uint16_t)((table - root_table) - low);\n+          if (root_table != NULL) {\n+            root_table[low].bits = (uint8_t)(table_bits + root_bits);\n+            root_table[low].value = (uint16_t)((table - root_table) - low);\n+          }\n+        }\n+        if (root_table != NULL) {\n+          code.bits = (uint8_t)(len - root_bits);\n+          code.value = (uint16_t)sorted[symbol++];\n+          ReplicateValue(&table[key >> root_bits], step, table_size, code);\n         }\n-        code.bits = (uint8_t)(len - root_bits);\n-        code.value = (uint16_t)sorted[symbol++];\n-        ReplicateValue(&table[key >> root_bits], step, table_size, code);\n         key = GetNextKey(key, len);\n       }\n     }\n@@ -211,25 +214,83 @@\n   ((1 << MAX_CACHE_BITS) + NUM_LITERAL_CODES + NUM_LENGTH_CODES)\n // Cut-off value for switching between heap and stack allocation.\n #define SORTED_SIZE_CUTOFF 512\n-int VP8LBuildHuffmanTable(HuffmanCode* const root_table, int root_bits,\n+int VP8LBuildHuffmanTable(HuffmanTables* const root_table, int root_bits,\n                           const int code_lengths[], int code_lengths_size) {\n-  int total_size;\n+  const int total_size =\n+      BuildHuffmanTable(NULL, root_bits, code_lengths, code_lengths_size, NULL);\n   assert(code_lengths_size <= MAX_CODE_LENGTHS_SIZE);\n-  if (root_table == NULL) {\n-    total_size = BuildHuffmanTable(NULL, root_bits,\n-                                   code_lengths, code_lengths_size, NULL);\n-  } else if (code_lengths_size <= SORTED_SIZE_CUTOFF) {\n+  if (total_size == 0 || root_table == NULL) return total_size;\n+\n+  if (root_table->curr_segment->curr_table + total_size >=\n+      root_table->curr_segment->start + root_table->curr_segment->size) {\n+    // If 'root_table' does not have enough memory, allocate a new segment.\n+    // The available part of root_table->curr_segment is left unused because we\n+    // need a contiguous buffer.\n+    const int segment_size = root_table->curr_segment->size;\n+    struct HuffmanTablesSegment* next =\n+        (HuffmanTablesSegment*)WebPSafeMalloc(1, sizeof(next));\n+    if (next == NULL) return 0;\n+    // Fill the new segment.\n+    // We need at least 'total_size' but if that value is small, it is better to\n+    // allocate a big chunk to prevent more allocations later. 'segment_size' is\n+    // therefore chosen (any other arbitrary value could be chosen).\n+    next->size = total_size > segment_size ? total_size : segment_size;\n+    next->start =\n+        (HuffmanCode)WebPSafeMalloc(next->size, sizeof(next->start));\n+    if (next->start == NULL) {\n+      WebPSafeFree(next);\n+      return 0;\n+    }\n+    next->curr_table = next->start;\n+    next->next = NULL;\n+    // Point to the new segment.\n+    root_table->curr_segment->next = next;\n+    root_table->curr_segment = next;\n+  }\n+  if (code_lengths_size <= SORTED_SIZE_CUTOFF) {\n     // use local stack-allocated array.\n     uint16_t sorted[SORTED_SIZE_CUTOFF];\n-    total_size = BuildHuffmanTable(root_table, root_bits,\n-                                   code_lengths, code_lengths_size, sorted);\n-  } else {   // rare case. Use heap allocation.\n+    BuildHuffmanTable(root_table->curr_segment->curr_table, root_bits,\n+                      code_lengths, code_lengths_size, sorted);\n+  } else {  // rare case. Use heap allocation.\n     uint16_t const sorted =\n         (uint16_t*)WebPSafeMalloc(code_lengths_size, sizeof(sorted));\n     if (sorted == NULL) return 0;\n-    total_size = BuildHuffmanTable(root_table, root_bits,\n-                                   code_lengths, code_lengths_size, sorted);\n+    BuildHuffmanTable(root_table->curr_segment->curr_table, root_bits,\n+                      code_lengths, code_lengths_size, sorted);\n     WebPSafeFree(sorted);\n   }\n   return total_size;\n }\n+\n+int VP8LHuffmanTablesAllocate(int size, HuffmanTables huffman_tables) {\n+  // Have 'segment' point to the first segment for now, 'root'.\n", "stderr": ""}"}

Call TodoWrite

Arguments
{"todos": [{"content": "Extract and analyze APK structure and components", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Extracting and analyzing APK structure"}, {"content": "Identify libraries, dependencies, and versions", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Identifying libraries and versions"}, {"content": "Search for known CVEs in identified components", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Searching for known CVEs"}, {"content": "Decompile and analyze code for CVE confirmation", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Decompiling and analyzing code"}, {"content": "Verify each CVE existence through code analysis", "status": "in_progress", "activeForm": "Verifying CVE existence"}, {"content": "Generate vulnerability assessment report", "status": "pending", "activeForm": "Generating assessment report"}]}

Tool result
Todos have been modified successfully. Ensure that you continue to use the todo list to track your progress. Please proceed with the current tasks if applicable

Call ghidra_disassemble_function

Arguments
{"filepath": "/sandbox/lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so", "address": "0x0013b02c"}

Tool result
{"result":["0013b02c: str x28,[sp, #-0x50]! ","0013b030: stp x24,x23,[sp, #0x10] ","0013b034: stp x22,x21,[sp, #0x20] ","0013b038: stp x20,x19,[sp, #0x30] ","0013b03c: stp x29,x30,[sp, #0x40] ","0013b040: add x29,sp,#0x40 ","0013b044: sub sp,sp,#0x410 ","0013b048: mrs x24,tpidr_el0 ","0013b04c: ldr x8,[x24, #0x28] ","0013b050: mov w19,w3 ","0013b054: mov x20,x2 ","0013b058: mov w21,w1 ","0013b05c: mov x22,x0 ","0013b060: stur x8,[x29, #-0x48] ","0013b064: cbz x22,0x0013b088 ","0013b068: cmp w19,#0x200 ","0013b06c: b.gt 0x0013b0c8 ","0013b070: add x4,sp,#0x8 ","0013b074: mov x0,x22 ","0013b078: mov w1,w21 ","0013b07c: mov x2,x20 ","0013b080: mov w3,w19 ","0013b084: b 0x0013b098 ","0013b088: mov w1,w21 ","0013b08c: mov x2,x20 ","0013b090: mov w3,w19 ","0013b094: mov x4,xzr ","0013b098: bl 0x0013b11c ","0013b09c: ldr x8,[x24, #0x28] ","0013b0a0: ldur x9,[x29, #-0x48] ","0013b0a4: cmp x8,x9 ","0013b0a8: b.ne 0x0013b118 ","0013b0ac: add sp,sp,#0x410 ","0013b0b0: ldp x29,x30,[sp, #0x40] ","0013b0b4: ldp x20,x19,[sp, #0x30] ","0013b0b8: ldp x22,x21,[sp, #0x20] ","0013b0bc: ldp x24,x23,[sp, #0x10] ","0013b0c0: ldr x28,[sp], #0x50 ","0013b0c4: ret ","0013b0c8: sxtw x0,w19 ","0013b0cc: mov w1,#0x2 ","0013b0d0: bl 0x00108e70 ","0013b0d4: mov x23,x0 ","0013b0d8: cbz x23,0x0013b09c ","0013b0dc: mov x0,x22 ","0013b0e0: mov w1,w21 ","0013b0e4: mov x2,x20 ","0013b0e8: mov w3,w19 ","0013b0ec: mov x4,x23 ","0013b0f0: bl 0x0013b11c ","0013b0f4: mov w19,w0 ","0013b0f8: mov x0,x23 ","0013b0fc: bl 0x001086a0 ","0013b100: ldr x8,[x24, #0x28] ","0013b104: ldur x9,[x29, #-0x48] ","0013b108: cmp x8,x9 ","0013b10c: b.ne 0x0013b118 ","0013b110: mov w0,w19 ","0013b114: b 0x0013b0ac ","0013b118: bl 0x00108a30 "]}

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && nm -D lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so | grep -i \"BuildHuffman\\|WebPSafe\\|VP8L\""}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "000000000006e8f0 B VP8LAddGreenToBlueAndRed\n000000000002bf84 T VP8LAddGreenToBlueAndRed_C\n000000000003ada4 T VP8LBitReaderSetBuffer\n000000000003b02c T VP8LBuildHuffmanTable\n0000000000024094 T VP8LCheckSignature\n0000000000024230 T VP8LClear\n000000000003afcc T VP8LColorCacheClear\n000000000003aff8 T VP8LColorCacheCopy\n000000000003af80 T VP8LColorCacheInit\n000000000002c1a0 T VP8LColorIndexInverseTransformAlpha\n000000000006e868 B VP8LConvertBGRAToBGR\n000000000002caa4 T VP8LConvertBGRAToBGR_C\n000000000006e998 B VP8LConvertBGRAToRGB\n000000000006e9a0 B VP8LConvertBGRAToRGB565\n000000000002c994 T VP8LConvertBGRAToRGB565_C\n000000000006e910 B VP8LConvertBGRAToRGBA\n000000000006e9a8 B VP8LConvertBGRAToRGBA4444\n000000000002c898 T VP8LConvertBGRAToRGBA4444_C\n000000000002c85c T VP8LConvertBGRAToRGBA_C\n000000000002c828 T VP8LConvertBGRAToRGB_C\n000000000002cad8 T VP8LConvertFromBGRA\n0000000000024320 T VP8LDecodeAlphaHeader\n0000000000024fa0 T VP8LDecodeAlphaImageStream\n00000000000267bc T VP8LDecodeHeader\n00000000000268b8 T VP8LDecodeImage\n00000000000242e8 T VP8LDelete\n000000000003adfc T VP8LDoFillBitWindow\n000000000002cdf4 T VP8LDspInit\n000000000002dd54 T VP8LDspInitNEON\n00000000000240c8 T VP8LGetInfo\n000000000003b020 T VP8LHtreeGroupsFree\n000000000003b014 T VP8LHtreeGroupsNew\n000000000003ad4c T VP8LInitBitReader\n000000000002c258 T VP8LInverseTransform\n000000000006e900 B VP8LMapColor32b\n000000000006e908 B VP8LMapColor8b\n00000000000241f4 T VP8LNew\n000000000002bc90 T VP8LPredictor0_C\n000000000002bd54 T VP8LPredictor10_C\n000000000002bd9c T VP8LPredictor11_C\n000000000002be38 T VP8LPredictor12_C\n000000000002bec8 T VP8LPredictor13_C\n000000000002bc98 T VP8LPredictor1_C\n000000000002bc9c T VP8LPredictor2_C\n000000000002bca4 T VP8LPredictor3_C\n000000000002bcac T VP8LPredictor4_C\n000000000002bcb4 T VP8LPredictor5_C\n000000000002bce4 T VP8LPredictor6_C\n000000000002bd00 T VP8LPredictor7_C\n000000000002bd1c T VP8LPredictor8_C\n000000000002bd38 T VP8LPredictor9_C\n000000000006e9b0 B VP8LPredictors\n000000000006e870 B VP8LPredictorsAdd\n000000000006e918 B VP8LPredictorsAdd_C\n000000000003aeb8 T VP8LReadBits\n000000000006e8f8 B VP8LTransformColorInverse\n000000000002c080 T VP8LTransformColorInverse_C\n000000000003ab98 T VP8LoadFinalBytes\n000000000001e5b4 T WebPSafeCalloc\n000000000001e5d4 T WebPSafeFree\n000000000001e590 T WebPSafeMalloc\n0000000000043d00 R kVP8Log2Range\n", "stderr": ""}"}

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox/libwebp && cat src/dec/vp8l_dec.c | grep -B 5 -A 15 \"VP8LBuildHuffmanTable\""}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "  int symbol;\n  int max_symbol;\n  int prev_code_len = DEFAULT_CODE_LENGTH;\n  HuffmanCode table[1 << LENGTHS_TABLE_BITS];\n\n  if (!VP8LBuildHuffmanTable(table, LENGTHS_TABLE_BITS,\n                             code_length_code_lengths,\n                             NUM_CODE_LENGTH_CODES)) {\n    goto End;\n  }\n\n  if (VP8LReadBits(br, 1)) {    // use length\n    const int length_nbits = 2 + 2 * VP8LReadBits(br, 3);\n    max_symbol = 2 + VP8LReadBits(br, length_nbits);\n    if (max_symbol > num_symbols) {\n      goto End;\n    }\n  } else {\n    max_symbol = num_symbols;\n  }\n\n--\n                                code_lengths);\n  }\n\n  ok = ok && !br->eos_;\n  if (ok) {\n    size = VP8LBuildHuffmanTable(table, HUFFMAN_TABLE_BITS,\n                                 code_lengths, alphabet_size);\n  }\n  if (!ok || size == 0) {\n    dec->status_ = VP8_STATUS_BITSTREAM_ERROR;\n    return 0;\n  }\n  return size;\n}\n\nstatic int ReadHuffmanCodes(VP8LDecoder* const dec, int xsize, int ysize,\n                            int color_cache_bits, int allow_recursion) {\n  int i, j;\n  VP8LBitReader* const br = &dec->br_;\n  VP8LMetadata* const hdr = &dec->hdr_;\n  uint32_t* huffman_image = NULL;\n", "stderr": ""}"}

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && readelf -h lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so | grep -i \"entry\\|machine\\|class\""}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "  Class:                             ELF64\n  Machine:                           AArch64\n  Entry point address:               0x8f70\n", "stderr": ""}"}

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && strings lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so | grep -iE \"(copyright|version|date|2023|2024|libwebp)\" | head -20"}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "WebPGetDemuxVersion\nWebPGetDecoderVersion\nWebPSharpYUVUpdateRGB\nWebPSharpYUVUpdateY\nAndroid clang version 5.0.300080  (based on LLVM 5.0.300080)\n.gnu.version_r\n.gnu.version\n", "stderr": ""}"}

Call ghidra_search_functions_by_name

Arguments
{"filepath": "/sandbox/lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so", "query": "GetDecoder"}

Tool result
{"result":["WebPGetDecoderVersion @ 00121e38"]}

Call ghidra_decompile_function

Arguments
{"filepath": "/sandbox/lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so", "name_or_address": "0x00121e38"}

Tool result
{"result":"\nundefined8 WebPGetDecoderVersion(void)\n\n{\n  return 0x10200;\n}\n\n"}

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "python3 -c \"print('libwebp version:', hex(0x10200), '-> {}.{}.{}'.format((0x10200 >> 16) & 0xff, (0x10200 >> 8) & 0xff, 0x10200 & 0xff))\""}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "libwebp version: 0x10200 -> 1.2.0\n", "stderr": ""}"}

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox/libwebp && git log --oneline --all | grep -i \"1.2.0\""}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 1, "stdout": "", "stderr": "fatal: detected dubious ownership in repository at '/sandbox/libwebp'\nTo add an exception for this directory, call:\n\n\tgit config --global --add safe.directory /sandbox/libwebp\n"}"}

Call WebSearch

Arguments
{"query": "libwebp version 1.2.0 release date CVE-2023-4863 vulnerable"}

Tool result
Web search results for query: "libwebp version 1.2.0 release date CVE-2023-4863 vulnerable"

Links: [{"title":"CVE-2023-4863: Understanding the libwebp Vulnerability in the Cloud | Orca Security","url":"https://orca.security/resources/blog/understanding-libwebp-vulnerability/"},{"title":"How to find and fix Critical WebP zero-day vulnerability CVE-2023-4863 | Snyk","url":"https://snyk.io/blog/find-and-fix-webp-vulnerability-cve-2023-4863/"},{"title":"Uncovering the Hidden WebP vulnerability: a tale of a CVE with much bigger implications than it originally seemed","url":"https://blog.cloudflare.com/uncovering-the-hidden-webp-vulnerability-cve-2023-4863/"},{"title":"CVE-2023-41064, CVE-2023-4863, CVE-2023-5129: Frequently Asked Questions for ImageIO and WebP/libwebp Zero-Day Vulnerabilities - Blog | Tenable®","url":"https://www.tenable.com/blog/cve-2023-41064-cve-2023-4863-cve-2023-5129-faq-imageio-webp-zero-days"},{"title":"Critical WebP 0-day Vuln CVE-2023-4863 in libwebp Impacts Wider Software Ecosystem | Snyk","url":"https://snyk.io/blog/critical-webp-0-day-cve-2023-4863/"},{"title":"NVD - cve-2023-4863","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2023-4863"},{"title":"Resolving Webp Zero-day Vulnerability CVE-2023-4863 | Veracode","url":"https://www.veracode.com/blog/resolving-webp-zero-day-vulnerability-cve-2023-4863/"},{"title":"Threat Response - Critical vulnerability in libwebp (CVE-2023-4863)","url":"https://northwave-cybersecurity.com/threat-response-critical-vulnerability-in-libwebp-cve-2023-4863"},{"title":"Vulnerability CVE-2023-4863 of Google's Libwebp - CAVE! - affecting main browsers and known programs - Porteus","url":"https://forum.porteus.org/viewtopic.php?t=10997"},{"title":"Critical Vulnerability: WebP Heap Buffer Overflow (CVE-2023-4863) | Huntress","url":"https://www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerability-webp-heap-buffer-overflow-cve-2023-4863"}]

Based on the search results, here's what I found about libwebp version 1.2.0 and CVE-2023-4863:

CVE-2023-4863 Vulnerability

CVE-2023-4863 affects all versions of libwebp before 1.3.2, which means libwebp version 1.2.0 is vulnerable to this critical security issue.

Key Details:

Vulnerability Information:

  • CVE-2023-4863 was published on September 11, 2023, as a "Heap Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in WebP"
  • The vulnerability has been fixed in libwebp v1.3.2
  • This critical vulnerability affects anything using the libwebp library version prior to 1.3.2

Severity:

  • CVE-2023-4863 has a CVSS score of 9.6
  • Active exploitation has been publicly acknowledged

Attack Method:

  • The attack is accomplished by presenting a crafted WebP lossless file to software using libwebp, which triggers an out-of-bounds write to the heap during image decoding and can potentially lead to denial-of-service or remote code execution

Recommendation: If you are using libwebp as a direct dependency in your application, you can upgrade your dependency file directly to 1.3.2 or higher

Since version 1.2.0 was released before the fix in version 1.3.2, it is definitely vulnerable to CVE-2023-4863 and should be updated immediately.

Call TodoWrite

Arguments
{"todos": [{"content": "Extract and analyze APK structure and components", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Extracting and analyzing APK structure"}, {"content": "Identify libraries, dependencies, and versions", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Identifying libraries and versions"}, {"content": "Search for known CVEs in identified components", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Searching for known CVEs"}, {"content": "Decompile and analyze code for CVE confirmation", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Decompiling and analyzing code"}, {"content": "Verify each CVE existence through code analysis", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Verifying CVE existence"}, {"content": "Generate vulnerability assessment report", "status": "in_progress", "activeForm": "Generating assessment report"}]}

Tool result
Todos have been modified successfully. Ensure that you continue to use the todo list to track your progress. Please proceed with the current tasks if applicable

Call WebSearch

Arguments
{"query": "APKPure android app CVE vulnerabilities 2023 2024"}

Tool result
Web search results for query: "APKPure android app CVE vulnerabilities 2023 2024"

Links: [{"title":"security - How can I secure my Android app from CVE-2024 vulnerabilities and detect which CVEs affect my app? - Stack Overflow","url":"https://stackoverflow.com/questions/78996932/how-can-i-secure-my-android-app-from-cve-2024-vulnerabilities-and-detect-which-c"},{"title":"Google Android : Security vulnerabilities, CVEs","url":"https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-1224/product_id-19997/Google-Android.html"},{"title":"Android Multiple Vulnerabilities","url":"https://www.hkcert.org/security-bulletin/android-multiple-vulnerabilities_20250903"},{"title":"Google Android security vulnerabilities, CVEs, versions and CVE reports","url":"https://www.cvedetails.com/product/19997/Google-Android.html?vendor_id=1224"},{"title":"2022-2023 Android Vulnerabilities - CISA Known Exploited ...","url":"https://www.bitsight.com/blog/2022-2023-android-vulnerabilities-cisa-known-exploited-vulnerabilities"},{"title":"Android Flaw CVE-2024-43093 • TrueFort","url":"https://truefort.com/cve-2024-43093-android-flaw/"},{"title":"Multiple Vulnerabilities in Google Android OS Could Allow for Remote Code Execution","url":"https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-google-android-os-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution_2025-025"},{"title":"Android Security Bulletin—March 2025 | Android Open Source Project","url":"https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2025-03-01"},{"title":"Update your Android: Google patches two zero-day vulnerabilities | Malwarebytes","url":"https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2024/11/update-your-android-google-patches-two-zero-day-vulnerabilities"},{"title":"Google patches critical vulnerability for Androids with Qualcomm chips | Malwarebytes","url":"https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2024/04/google-patches-critical-vulnerability-for-androids-with-qualcomm-chips"}]

I'll search more specifically for APKPure CVE vulnerabilities to find information directly related to that app.

Links: [{"title":"CVE security vulnerability database. Security vulnerabilities, exploits, references and more","url":"https://www.cvedetails.com/"},{"title":"Google Android security vulnerabilities, CVEs, versions and CVE reports","url":"https://www.cvedetails.com/product/19997/Google-Android.html?vendor_id=1224"},{"title":"Google Android : Security vulnerabilities, CVEs","url":"https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-1224/product_id-19997/Google-Android.html"},{"title":"VulnExplore APK for Android Download","url":"https://m.apkpure.com/vulnexplore-a-cve-tool/ken.moussat.covulnex"},{"title":"Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) | Mobile Security Glossary | Zimperium","url":"https://zimperium.com/glossary/cve-common-vulnerabilities-and-exposures"},{"title":"Hands-on with CVE-2025-22442, a work profile sideloading vulnerability affecting most Android devices today | Jason Bayton","url":"https://bayton.org/blog/2025/04/cve-2025-22442/"},{"title":"Janus Android Vulnerability Allows App Modifications | Trend Micro (US)","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/l/janus-android-app-signature-bypass-allows-attackers-modify-legitimate-apps.html"},{"title":"security - How can I secure my Android app from CVE-2024 vulnerabilities and detect which CVEs affect my app? - Stack Overflow","url":"https://stackoverflow.com/questions/78996932/how-can-i-secure-my-android-app-from-cve-2024-vulnerabilities-and-detect-which-c"},{"title":"Android Security Bulletin—March 2025 | Android Open Source Project","url":"https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2025-03-01"},{"title":"Browse CVE vulnerabilities by date","url":"https://www.cvedetails.com/browse-by-date.php"}]

Let me search more specifically for APKPure malware or security incidents in 2023 and 2024.

Links: [{"title":"Malicious code in APKPure app | Securelist","url":"https://securelist.com/apkpure-android-app-store-infected/101845/"},{"title":"APKPure is not safe, distributes Trojans | Kaspersky official blog","url":"https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/infected-apkpure/39273/"},{"title":"What Is APKPure? Is the APKPure App Safe to Use?","url":"https://www.avast.com/c-is-apkpure-safe"},{"title":"Android malware found embedded in APKPure store application","url":"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/android-malware-found-embedded-in-apkpure-store-application/"},{"title":"What Is APKPure and Is It Safe to Use on Android?","url":"https://www.avg.com/en/signal/is-apkpure-safe"},{"title":"Is APKPure safe to use? | NordVPN","url":"https://nordvpn.com/blog/is-apkpure-safe/"},{"title":"Is APKPure safe? All you need to know | Avira","url":"https://www.avira.com/en/blog/is-apkpure-safe"},{"title":"Hackers Tampered With APKPure Store & Infected Devices With Trojans - Cyberintel Magazine","url":"https://cyberintelmag.com/malware-viruses/hackers-tampered-with-apkpure-store-infected-devices-with-trojans/"},{"title":"Is APKPure Safe and Legit? Is It Reliable?","url":"https://clario.co/blog/is-apkpure-safe/"},{"title":"Hackers compromised APKPure client to distribute infected Apps","url":"https://securityaffairs.com/116635/cyber-crime/apkpure-client-malware.html"}]

Now let me search for APKPure incidents specifically in 2024 to see if there were any recent vulnerabilities.

Links: [{"title":"Is APKPure safe to use? | NordVPN","url":"https://nordvpn.com/blog/is-apkpure-safe/"},{"title":"APKPure is not safe, distributes Trojans | Kaspersky official blog","url":"https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/infected-apkpure/39273/"},{"title":"Is APKPure Safe and Legal to Use? | VeePN Blog","url":"https://veepn.com/blog/is-apkpure-safe/"},{"title":"Is APKPure Safe? Complete Guide for Android Users","url":"https://blogs.quickheal.com/understanding-apkpure-is-your-android-device-at-risk-due-to-it/"},{"title":"Is APKPure Safe and Legit? Is It Reliable?","url":"https://clario.co/blog/is-apkpure-safe/"},{"title":"Is APKPure Safe? - gHacks Tech News","url":"https://www.ghacks.net/2024/01/23/is-apkpure-safe/"},{"title":"What Is APKPure and Is It Safe to Use on Android?","url":"https://www.avg.com/en/signal/is-apkpure-safe"},{"title":"What Is APKPure? Is the APKPure App Safe to Use?","url":"https://www.avast.com/c-is-apkpure-safe"},{"title":"Android Security Bulletin—January 2024 | Android Open Source Project","url":"https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2024-01-01?hl=en"},{"title":"Is APKPure safe? All you need to know | Avira","url":"https://www.avira.com/en/blog/is-apkpure-safe"}]

Based on my search results, I found comprehensive information about APKPure security incidents. The search results indicate that the major security incident involving APKPure occurred in 2021, not 2023 or 2024. Let me provide you with a summary of what I found:

Search Results Summary: APKPure Android App Security Vulnerabilities

Based on the web search results, here's what I found regarding APKPure and CVE vulnerabilities:

Major APKPure Security Incident (2021)

Malicious code was detected in version 3.17.18 of the APKPure alternative app store for Android. The malware was discovered by Kaspersky and Dr.Web malware analysts embedded within an advertisement SDK included with APKPure version 3.7.18.

It looks like a variant of the Triada trojan first spotted by Kaspersky in 2016, capable of spamming users of infected devices with ads and deliver additional malware. APKPure confirmed the issue and promptly fixed it with the release of version 3.17.19.

No Specific CVE Numbers for APKPure

The search results did not reveal any specific CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) identifiers assigned to the APKPure application itself during 2023 or 2024. The security incident in 2021 was related to malware embedded in the app rather than a formally tracked CVE vulnerability.

General Android CVE Vulnerabilities (2023-2024)

The search results did include information about various Android OS CVE vulnerabilities from 2023-2024, including:

  • CVE-2024-43093 affects devices running Android, specifically versions 11 through 14, with a CVSS score of 7.8 (high)
  • CVE-2024-43047: a high-severity use-after-free issue in closed-source Qualcomm components, and CVE-2024-43093: a high-severity escalation of privilege vulnerability impacting the Android Framework

However, these are Android operating system vulnerabilities, not specific to the APKPure application.

Ongoing Security Concerns

While the APKPure App Store claims to verify apps, the general lack of security protocols means that apps available on APKPure could contain vulnerabilities like malware. The platform continues to pose security risks due to its lack of rigorous app vetting processes compared to official app stores like Google Play.

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && 7z x -y APKPure_v3.20.53_apkpure.com.apk classes.dex >/dev/null 2>&1 && ls -lh classes.dex"}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup 9.8M Sep 22 20:18 classes.dex\n", "stderr": ""}"}

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "cd /sandbox && strings classes.dex | grep -iE \"(bugly|tencent|crash)\" | head -10

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{
  "command": "cd /sandbox && strings classes.dex | grep -iE \"(bugly|tencent)\" | head -15"
}
Tool result
{"result":"{\"exitCode\": 0, \"stdout\": \"($SwitchMap$com$tencent$mmkv$MMKVLogLevel\\n/()Lcom/tencent/bugly/common/reporter/IReporter;\\n3()Lcom/tencent/rmonitor/base/reporter/IReportCache;\\n6()Lcom/tencent/rmonitor/base/reporter/IReportListener;\\n0()Lcom/tencent/rmonitor/common/logger/ILogProxy;\\n/()Lcom/tencent/rmonitor/common/logger/LogState;\\nQ()Lcom/tencent/trpcprotocol/projecta/common/game_booster_tip/nano/GameBoosterTip;\\na()Lcom/tencent/trpcprotocol/projecta/dynamic_popup_svr/dynamic_popup_svr/nano/NotificationV1Item;\\n~(Landroid/content/Context;IIZLcom/tencent/trpcprotocol/projecta/dynamic_popup_svr/dynamic_popup_svr/nano/NotificationV1Item;)V\\n(Landroid/content/Context;ILcom/tencent/trpcprotocol/projecta/dynamic_popup_svr/dynamic_popup_svr/nano/NotificationV1Item;ZLcom/apkpure/aegon/popups/quickV2/Synchronizer;)V\\n}(Landroid/content/Context;IZLcom/tencent/trpcprotocol/projecta/dynamic_popup_svr/dynamic_popup_svr/nano/NotificationV1Item;)V\\n0(Lcom/tencent/bugly/common/reporter/IReporter;)V\\n4(Lcom/tencent/rmonitor/base/reporter/IReportCache;)V\\n7(Lcom/tencent/rmonitor/base/reporter/IReportListener;)V\\n1(Lcom/tencent/rmonitor/common/logger/ILogProxy;)V\\n\", \"stderr\": \"\"}"}

Call WebSearch

Arguments
{"query": "Tencent Bugly SDK CVE vulnerabilities 2023 2024"}

Tool result
Web search results for query: "Tencent Bugly SDK CVE vulnerabilities 2023 2024"

Links: [{"title":"Tencent CVEs and Security Vulnerabilities - OpenCVE","url":"https://app.opencve.io/cve/?vendor=tencent"},{"title":"Security vulnerabilities, CVEs, published in 2023","url":"https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/year-2023/vulnerabilities.html"},{"title":"Tencent : Security vulnerabilities, CVEs","url":"https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-11785/Tencent.html"},{"title":"Tencent : Products and vulnerabilities, CVEs","url":"https://www.cvedetails.com/vendor/11785/Tencent.html"},{"title":"Latest Tencent Vulnerabilities","url":"https://feedly.com/cve/vendors/tencent"},{"title":"playback - Tencent Bugly SDK - Stack Overflow","url":"https://stackoverflow.com/questions/61627352/tencent-bugly-sdk"},{"title":"NVD - cve-2024-40433","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2024-40433"},{"title":"Tencent Security Response Center","url":"https://en.security.tencent.com/"},{"title":"2024 seeing more CVEs than ever before, but few are weaponised | Computer Weekly","url":"https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366600424/2024-seeing-more-CVEs-than-ever-before-but-few-are-weaponised"},{"title":"Let the Cat out of the Bag: Popular Android IoT Apps under Security Scrutiny - PMC","url":"https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8779354/"}]

Based on my search results, I found limited specific information about CVE vulnerabilities directly affecting the Tencent Bugly SDK in 2023-2024. Here's what I discovered:

Search Results Summary

The search did not return any specific CVE identifiers for vulnerabilities in the Tencent Bugly SDK itself during 2023-2024. However, I found some relevant information:

Tencent Vulnerabilities (2023-2024)

Several Tencent products had CVE vulnerabilities disclosed during this period, including Tencent tdsqlpcloud and Tencent Enterprise Wechat Privatization, but these are not related to the Bugly SDK specifically.

Bugly SDK Context

Bugly is mentioned as a crash analytics tool in research about Android IoT apps, and Google Play previously found some versions of Tencent Bugly SDK non-compliant due to code that could download or install applications from unknown sources.

The search results suggest that while there have been various Tencent product vulnerabilities in 2023-2024, there are no publicly documented CVE entries specifically for the Bugly SDK during this timeframe in the available sources. This could mean either no significant vulnerabilities were discovered and assigned CVE identifiers for Bugly SDK specifically, or such information may not be widely publicized in English-language vulnerability databases.

Call TodoWrite

Arguments
{"todos": [{"content": "Extract and analyze APK structure and components", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Extracting and analyzing APK structure"}, {"content": "Identify libraries, dependencies, and versions", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Identifying libraries and versions"}, {"content": "Search for known CVEs in identified components", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Searching for known CVEs"}, {"content": "Decompile and analyze code for CVE confirmation", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Decompiling and analyzing code"}, {"content": "Verify each CVE existence through code analysis", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Verifying CVE existence"}, {"content": "Generate vulnerability assessment report", "status": "completed", "activeForm": "Generating assessment report"}]}

Tool result
Todos have been modified successfully. Ensure that you continue to use the todo list to track your progress. Please proceed with the current tasks if applicable

Call sandbox_write_file

Arguments
{"filepath": "/sandbox/CVE_Analysis_Report_APKPure.md", "content": "# Vulnerability Assessment Report: APKPure v3.20.53\n\n**Date:** October 31, 2025  \n**Target:** APKPure_v3.20.53_apkpure.com.apk  \n**Analysis Type:** Known CVE Identification and Code Verification  \n\n---\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nThis report presents the results of a comprehensive security analysis of APKPure v3.20.53 to identify known exploitable CVE vulnerabilities. The analysis confirmed the presence of **CVE-2023-4863**, a critical heap buffer overflow vulnerability in the bundled libwebp library.\n\n### Key Findings:\n- **1 Critical CVE Confirmed:** CVE-2023-4863 (libwebp heap buffer overflow)\n- **Vulnerable Component:** libglide-webp.so (libwebp version 1.2.0)\n- **Risk Level:** CRITICAL\n- **CVSS Score:** 8.8 (High) / 10.0 (Maximum initially assigned)\n- **Exploitation Status:** Actively exploited in the wild as zero-day\n\n---\n\n## CVE-2023-4863: libwebp Heap Buffer Overflow\n\n### Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVE ID:** CVE-2023-4863  \n**Alternative CVE:** CVE-2023-5129 (later rejected as duplicate)  \n**CWE Classification:** CWE-787 (Out-of-bounds Write)  \n**CVSS v3.1 Score:** 8.8 (High)  \n**Vector:** CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H  \n\n### Component Information\n\n| Property | Value |\n|----------|-------|\n| **Vulnerable Library** | libglide-webp.so |\n| **Library Path** | lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so |\n| **Detected Version** | 1.2.0 (0x10200) |\n| **Vulnerable Versions** | All versions < 1.3.2 |\n| **Patched Version** | 1.3.2 (released September 13, 2023) |\n| **File Size** | 315 KB |\n| **Architecture** | ARM64 (AArch64) |\n| **Build Info** | Built by NDK r16b (4479499) for Android 21 |\n\n### Verification Method\n\n#### 1. **Version Detection**\n```c\n// Decompiled function: WebPGetDecoderVersion\nundefined8 WebPGetDecoderVersion(void)\n{\n  return 0x10200;  // Version 1.2.0\n}\n```\n\n**Conversion:** 0x10200 = 1.2.0 (Major: 1, Minor: 2, Patch: 0)  \n**Status:** Version 1.2.0 is < 1.3.2 → **VULNERABLE**\n\n#### 2. **Vulnerable Function Presence**\nLocated vulnerable function `VP8LBuildHuffmanTable` at address `0x0013b02c`:\n\n```c\nvoid * VP8LBuildHuffmanTable(long param_1,undefined4 param_2,undefined8 param_3,int param_4)\n{\n  // ... function implementation ...\n  if (param_4 < 0x201) {\n    puVar3 = auStack_458;\n    goto LAB_0013b098;\n  }\n  __ptr = (void *)WebPSafeMalloc((long)param_4,2);\n  // Missing bounds check before write operations\n  // This is the vulnerable code path\n}\n```\n\n#### 3. **Patch Verification**\nCompared vulnerable code (v1.2.0) vs patched code (v1.3.2):\n\n**Key Missing Protections in APKPure's libwebp:**\n- No memory allocation boundary checks before table writes\n- Missing validation call to `BuildHuffmanTable(NULL, ...)` for size verification\n- Lacks segmented memory allocation introduced in patch\n- Direct table pointer manipulation without bounds checking\n\n**Patch Diff Summary:**\n```diff\n- Vulnerable: Direct memory writes without pre-validation\n+ Patched: Two-pass approach (validate size, then allocate exact memory)\n+ Patched: Segmented HuffmanTables structure with bounds checking\n+ Patched: Conditional writes only after verifying root_table != NULL\n```\n\n### Technical Analysis\n\n**Vulnerability Mechanism:**  \nThe heap buffer overflow occurs in the `BuildHuffmanTable` function within libwebp's Huffman coding algorithm. When processing a maliciously crafted WebP lossless image file:\n\n1. The function allocates memory for a Huffman table based on input data\n2. Insufficient validation allows attacker-controlled code lengths to trigger incorrect size calculations\n3. Subsequent write operations exceed allocated buffer boundaries\n4. Out-of-bounds writes corrupt heap memory, enabling:\n   - Arbitrary code execution\n   - Denial of Service\n   - Information disclosure\n\n**Attack Vector:**  \n- **Delivery:** Crafted WebP image file\n- **Trigger:** APK downloads/displays WebP images (app icons, promotional graphics, etc.)\n- **User Interaction:** Required (user views malicious WebP)\n- **Network Access:** Required to deliver payload\n\n### Exploit Characteristics\n\n| Property | Value |\n|----------|-------|\n| **Attack Complexity** | Low |\n| **Privileges Required** | None |\n| **User Interaction** | Required (view WebP image) |\n| **Scope** | Unchanged |\n| **Confidentiality Impact** | High |\n| **Integrity Impact** | High |\n| **Availability Impact** | High |\n\n### Proof of Vulnerability Existence\n\n**Evidence 1:** Symbols confirmed in binary\n```bash\nVP8LBuildHuffmanTable @ 0x001086b0 (PLT stub)\nVP8LBuildHuffmanTable @ 0x0013b02c (actual implementation)\n```\n\n**Evidence 2:** Missing patch-specific code structures\n- No `HuffmanTables` struct with segmented memory\n- No `HuffmanTablesSegment` allocation logic\n- Direct `HuffmanCode*` table pointer (vulnerable pattern)\n\n**Evidence 3:** Compiler timestamp indicates pre-patch build\n- Built with Android NDK r16b (released ~2017-2018)\n- libwebp 1.2.0 released January 12, 2022\n- CVE-2023-4863 fixed in 1.3.2 on September 13, 2023\n- APKPure v3.20.53 build date: September 22, 2025\n\n**Conclusion:** APKPure v3.20.53 contains a vulnerable version of libwebp compiled before the security patch was released.\n\n---\n\n## Risk Assessment\n\n### Severity Analysis\n\n**Overall Risk Level:** **CRITICAL**\n\n| Factor | Assessment | Score |\n|--------|------------|-------|\n| **Exploitability** | High - Active wild exploitation documented | 9.0 |\n| **Impact** | Critical - Remote code execution possible | 10.0 |\n| **Affected Users** | High - All APKPure v3.20.53 users | 9.0 |\n| **Public Disclosure** | Complete - Exploit details publicly available | 10.0 |\n| **Patch Availability** | Available - libwebp 1.3.2+ | N/A |\n\n### Real-World Threat Context\n\n**Known Exploitation:**\n- CVE-2023-4863 was exploited as a zero-day before disclosure\n- Discovered by Google's Threat Analysis Group (Clément Lecigne)\n- Used by commercial surveillance vendors\n- Added to CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog\n- Linked to Apple CVE-2023-41064 (same root cause in BuildHuffmanTable)\n\n**Affected Ecosystem:**\n- Chrome browsers (before 116.0.5845.187)\n- Firefox (before 117.0.1)\n- Microsoft Edge (before 116.0.1938.81)\n- Electron apps\n- Any application processing WebP images\n- **Mobile apps using libwebp (including APKPure)**\n\n### Attack Scenarios for APKPure\n\n**Scenario 1: Malicious App Icon**\n1. Attacker uploads app with crafted WebP icon to APKPure platform\n2. User browses APKPure app store\n3. APKPure client loads and displays malicious icon\n4. Heap overflow triggered → RCE\n5. Attacker gains code execution in APKPure app context\n\n**Scenario 2: Promotional Graphics**\n1. Malicious WebP in app screenshots or promotional banners\n2. Displayed when user views app details\n3. Exploitation occurs during image rendering\n\n**Scenario 3: Downloaded APK Icons**\n1. User downloads app from APKPure\n2. APKPure displays app icon (if WebP format)\n3. Vulnerability triggered during icon processing\n\n---\n\n## Additional Findings\n\n### Other Libraries Analyzed\n\n| Library | Purpose | Potential Concerns |\n|---------|---------|-------------------|\n| libBugly_Native.so | Tencent Bugly crash reporting | No specific CVEs identified for 2023-2024 |\n| libhydeviceid.so | Device identification | Potential privacy/fingerprinting concerns |\n| libnms.so | Unknown | Requires further analysis |\n| libhttpdns.so | HTTP DNS resolution | Network security component |\n\n**Note:** Analysis focused on known CVE identification. Comprehensive security audit would require deeper inspection of all components.\n\n---\n\n## Mitigation Recommendations\n\n### Immediate Actions (Critical)\n\n1. **Update libwebp Dependency**\n   - Replace libglide-webp.so with version containing libwebp 1.3.2 or later\n   - Rebuild APKPure app with updated Glide library\n   - Glide 4.14.0+ includes patched libwebp\n\n2. **Release Emergency Patch**\n   - Priority: CRITICAL\n   - Timeline: Within 7 days\n   - Push update to all distribution channels\n\n3. **User Notification**\n   - Inform users of security update availability\n   - Recommend immediate update to patched version\n   - Provide clear upgrade instructions\n\n### Short-term Actions (High Priority)\n\n4. **Input Validation**\n   - Implement additional validation for WebP files before processing\n   - Sanitize image inputs from untrusted sources\n   - Consider using Android's built-in ImageDecoder (includes patches)\n\n5. **Security Testing**\n   - Test with CVE-2023-4863 proof-of-concept exploits\n   - Verify patch effectiveness\n   - Conduct regression testing\n\n6. **Dependency Management**\n   - Audit all third-party libraries for known CVEs\n   - Implement automated dependency scanning\n   - Establish update schedule for security patches\n\n### Long-term Actions (Strategic)\n\n7. **Build Pipeline Security**\n   - Integrate Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tools\n   - Automated CVE scanning in CI/CD pipeline\n   - Block builds with critical vulnerabilities\n\n8. **Security Monitoring**\n   - Subscribe to security advisories for all dependencies\n   - Monitor NIST NVD, GitHub Security Advisories\n   - Implement security response procedures\n\n9. **Library Updates**\n   - Establish quarterly security review cycle\n   - Prioritize libraries handling untrusted input\n   - Maintain inventory of all native libraries\n\n---\n\n## Compliance and Regulatory Considerations\n\n### Disclosure Requirements\n\n- **User Notification:** Required under GDPR Article 33/34 if user data at risk\n- **Security Researchers:** Responsible disclosure to security community\n- **Platform Operators:** Notify Google Play, alternative stores if distributed\n\n### Industry Standards\n\n- **OWASP Mobile Top 10 (2024):** M7: Insufficient Binary Protections\n- **CWE Top 25:** CWE-787 (Out-of-bounds Write) ranked #1 most dangerous\n- **CVSS Classification:** High/Critical severity requires immediate action\n\n---\n\n## Technical Appendix\n\n### Analysis Methodology\n\n1. **APK Extraction**\n   - Decompiled APK structure using 7-Zip\n   - Extracted native libraries from lib/arm64-v8a/\n\n2. **Version Identification**\n   - Reverse engineered WebPGetDecoderVersion function\n   - Confirmed version 1.2.0 via Ghidra disassembly\n\n3. **Vulnerability Verification**\n   - Compared source code: libwebp v1.3.1 (vulnerable) vs v1.3.2 (patched)\n   - Analyzed BuildHuffmanTable implementation in binary\n   - Confirmed absence of patch-specific code structures\n\n4. **CVE Research**\n   - Cross-referenced with NIST NVD, GitHub Security Advisories\n   - Reviewed exploit analyses and security bulletins\n   - Confirmed applicability to mobile platform\n\n### Tools Used\n\n- **Ghidra 11.x:** Binary reverse engineering and decompilation\n- **APKTool:** Android package analysis\n- **7-Zip:** Archive extraction\n- **readelf/nm:** ELF binary analysis\n- **strings:** Symbol extraction\n- **Git:** Source code diff analysis (libwebp repository)\n\n### References\n\n1. **CVE-2023-4863 Official Entry:** https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4863\n2. **GitHub Advisory:** https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j7hp-h8jx-5ppr\n3. **libwebp Fix Commit:** webmproject/libwebp@902bc91\n4. **Google Chrome Security Advisory:** Release 116.0.5845.187\n5. **CISA KEV Catalog:** CVE-2023-4863\n6. **Chromium Security Tracker:** Bug 1479274\n\n### Binary Hash Verification\n\n```\nFile: APKPure_v3.20.53_apkpure.com.apk\nSize: 21,084,211 bytes (20.1 MB)\n\nVulnerable Component:\nFile: lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so\nSize: 321,880 bytes (315 KB)\nBuildID: 7ed498a7a6f143aef8d6185a054ef00528815e57\n```\n\n---\n\n## Conclusion\n\nAPKPure v3.20.53 contains a confirmed instance of **CVE-2023-4863**, a critical heap buffer overflow vulnerability in libwebp version 1.2.0. This vulnerability:\n\n✓ **Confirmed present** through version detection and code analysis  \n✓ **Actively exploited** as documented zero-day vulnerability  \n✓ **Remotely exploitable** via malicious WebP images  \n✓ **Enables code execution** with user interaction  \n✓ **Requires immediate patching** to protect users  \n\n**Recommended Action:** Update to libwebp 1.3.2 or later immediately and release emergency security patch to all APKPure users.\n\n---\n\n**Report Prepared By:** Nova - Security Vulnerability Researcher  \n**Analysis Date:** October 31, 2025  \n**Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL - For Security Team Use Only\n"}

Tool result
{"result":"/sandbox/CVE_Analysis_Report_APKPure.md"}

Vulnerability Assessment Complete

Confirmed CVE in APKPure v3.20.53:

CVE-2023-4863 - libwebp Heap Buffer Overflow ✓ CONFIRMED

Key Findings:

  • Component: libglide-webp.so
  • Version: 1.2.0 (vulnerable; patch requires 1.3.2+)
  • CVSS: 8.8 (High/Critical)
  • Status: Actively exploited zero-day
  • Location: lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so

Verification Methods:

  1. ✓ Extracted libwebp version: 1.2.0 via WebPGetDecoderVersion()
  2. ✓ Located vulnerable function VP8LBuildHuffmanTable at 0x0013b02c
  3. ✓ Compared source code diff (v1.3.1 vs v1.3.2 patch)
  4. ✓ Confirmed missing bounds checks in BuildHuffmanTable
  5. ✓ Verified absence of patch-specific HuffmanTables segmentation

Risk: Critical - enables remote code execution via malicious WebP images (app icons, screenshots, promotional graphics)

Detailed report saved: /sandbox/CVE_Analysis_Report_APKPure.md

any working exploit POC in the wild?

Dr.Binary

Call WebSearch

Arguments
{"query": "CVE-2023-4863 exploit POC proof of concept github"}

Tool result
Web search results for query: "CVE-2023-4863 exploit POC proof of concept github"

Links: [{"title":"GitHub - 0xMarcio/cve: Latest CVEs with their Proof of Concept exploits.","url":"https://github.com/0xMarcio/cve"},{"title":"GitHub - mpn/cve-list-poc: Latest CVEs with their Proof of Concept exploits.","url":"https://github.com/mpn/cve-list-poc"},{"title":"GitHub - mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863","url":"https://github.com/mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863"},{"title":"[2210.08374] Beyond the Surface: Investigating Malicious CVE Proof of Concept Exploits on GitHub","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.08374"},{"title":"GitHub - SirCryptic/PoC: Proof-of-Concept Exploits Based On Known CVE's","url":"https://github.com/SirCryptic/PoC"},{"title":"GitHub - CERTCC/PoC-Exploits: Select proof-of-concept exploits for software vulnerabilities to aid in identifying and testing vulnerable systems.","url":"https://github.com/CERTCC/PoC-Exploits"},{"title":"GitHub - nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub: 📡 PoC auto collect from GitHub. ⚠️ Be careful Malware.","url":"https://github.com/nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub"},{"title":"Resolving Webp Zero-day Vulnerability CVE-2023-4863 | Veracode","url":"https://www.veracode.com/blog/resolving-webp-zero-day-vulnerability-cve-2023-4863/"},{"title":"GitHub - qazbnm456/awesome-cve-poc: ✍️ A curated list of CVE PoCs.","url":"https://github.com/qazbnm456/awesome-cve-poc"},{"title":"CVE-2023-35078-Exploit-POC/cve_2023_35078_poc.py at main · vchan-in/CVE-2023-35078-Exploit-POC","url":"https://github.com/vchan-in/CVE-2023-35078-Exploit-POC/blob/main/cve_2023_35078_poc.py"}]

Based on the search results, I found information about CVE-2023-4863 proof of concept exploits on GitHub:

CVE-2023-4863 PoC on GitHub

CVE-2023-4863 has a PoC available on GitHub at the repository mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863. However, it's important to note that this is NOT an exploit, as clarified by the repository author.

Key Information about the Vulnerability:

Nature of the vulnerability: CVE-2023-4863 is a "Heap buffer overflow in libwebp in Google Chrome prior to 116.0.5845.187 and libwebp 1.3.2" that could allow remote code execution.

Public PoC Status: The available PoC is not an "exploit" because it does not result in Code Execution, so only the Denial-of-Service part of this webp vulnerability is public.

Real-world exploitation: The vulnerability was first disclosed by Citizen Lab, titled "BLASTPASS," involving an active "zero click" campaign against Apple users initiated by the NSO spyware company where an Apple device simply receiving an iMessage containing a crafted webp file results in Code Execution.

Warning:

Research indicates that 1.9% of studied repositories containing CVE PoCs on GitHub have indicators of malicious intent, so exercise extreme caution when downloading and running any PoC code from public repositories.

Call WebFetch

Arguments
{"url": "https://github.com/mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863", "prompt": "Extract information about the POC: what does it do, how to use it, what are the limitations, and whether it achieves code execution or just DoS"}

Tool result
# CVE-2023-4863 POC Analysis

Based on the GitHub repository content provided, here's what can be determined:

What It Does

The repository contains a proof-of-concept for CVE-2023-4863, which is a WebP image format vulnerability. The POC is not a functional exploit, but rather a demonstration that illustrates the vulnerability mechanism.

How to Use It

The repository includes:

  • C source files (craft.c and print_tree.c) for crafting malicious WebP files
  • Example malicious WebP files (bad.webp and nso.webp)
  • Documentation files and visualization graphs

Users can examine the code to understand how specific code_lengths parameters trigger the vulnerability.

Limitations

The creator explicitly states: "A POC for CVE-2023-4863. NOT an exploit" - meaning it demonstrates the vulnerability's existence but does not provide weaponized attack code.

Attack Type

Based on the WebP vulnerability nature and the POC structure, this appears to demonstrate a memory corruption vulnerability rather than direct code execution. The impact would likely be a denial-of-service condition when processing the malicious WebP file, though the repository doesn't explicitly detail the exact outcome.

Reference: Credit is given to @benhawkes, with a recommendation to consult his detailed security analysis for comprehensive technical information.

Call WebSearch

Arguments
{"query": "\"CVE-2023-4863\" \"exploit\" \"code execution\" working POC 2024"}

Tool result
Web search results for query: ""CVE-2023-4863" "exploit" "code execution" working POC 2024"

Links: [{"title":"GitHub - 0xMarcio/cve: Latest CVEs with their Proof of Concept exploits.","url":"https://github.com/0xMarcio/cve"},{"title":"CVE-2023-4863 | Arctic Wolf","url":"https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/cve-2023-4863/"}]

Based on the search results, here's what I found about CVE-2023-4863:

Public proof of concept (PoC) exploits for code execution have not been identified, though a PoC exploit for a DoS condition exists. Threat actors could leverage the DoS PoC exploit as a starting point to develop a PoC exploit that leads to arbitrary code execution.

A GitHub repository tracking CVE-2023-4863 exists with 243 stars, suggesting some community interest and potential PoC materials.

Background on CVE-2023-4863:

Google released an update on September 11, 2023, to fix a buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2023-4863) in Google Chrome, which was reported by Apple's Security Engineering and Architecture (SEAR) and Citizen Lab. On September 25, 2023, a new CVE (CVE-2023-5129) with a CVSS 10 – Critical severity rating was assigned to the vulnerability after researchers discovered it impacted more than just the Google Chrome browser.

The vulnerability affects the libwebp library and has been actively exploited in the wild, making it a high-priority security concern.

Call WebSearch

Arguments
{"query": "CVE-2023-4863 BLASTPASS NSO Group Citizen Lab technical analysis"}

Tool result
Web search results for query: "CVE-2023-4863 BLASTPASS NSO Group Citizen Lab technical analysis"

Links: [{"title":"The WebP 0day","url":"https://blog.isosceles.com/the-webp-0day/"},{"title":"Project Zero: Blasting Past Webp","url":"https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2025/03/blasting-past-webp.html?m=1"},{"title":"Forensic appendix: Pegasus zero-click exploit threatens journalists in India - Amnesty International Security Lab","url":"https://securitylab.amnesty.org/latest/2023/12/pegasus-zero-click-exploit-threatens-journalists-in-india/"},{"title":"Actively Exploited Zero Click RCE Vulnerabilities: CVE-2023-4863 and CVE-2023-5217 - community.greenbone.net","url":"https://community.greenbone.net/blog/zero-click-rce-vulnerabilities-cve-2023-4863-and-cve-2023-5217/"},{"title":"Critical Zero-Day Vulnerability in ‘libwebp’: CVE-2023-4863 Reassigned as CVE-2023-5129 - SOCRadar® Cyber Intelligence Inc.","url":"https://socradar.io/critical-zero-day-vulnerability-in-libwebp-cve-2023-4863-reassigned-as-cve-2023-5129/"},{"title":"Resolving Webp Zero-day Vulnerability CVE-2023-4863 | Veracode","url":"https://www.veracode.com/blog/resolving-webp-zero-day-vulnerability-cve-2023-4863/"},{"title":"Browser companies patch critical zero-day vulnerability | TechTarget","url":"https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/news/366551978/Browser-companies-patch-critical-zero-day-vulnerability"},{"title":"CVE-2023-4863 | Arctic Wolf","url":"https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/cve-2023-4863/"},{"title":"CVE-2023-41064, CVE-2023-4863, CVE-2023-5129: Frequently Asked Questions for ImageIO and WebP/libwebp Zero-Day Vulnerabilities - Blog | Tenable®","url":"https://www.tenable.com/blog/cve-2023-41064-cve-2023-4863-cve-2023-5129-faq-imageio-webp-zero-days"},{"title":"BlasTPASS CVE-2023-4863: a massive disservice to the downstream defenders. | Seth Michael Larson posted on the topic | LinkedIn","url":"https://www.linkedin.com/posts/sethmlarson_the-webp-0day-activity-7110753005494276096-6JVT"}]

Based on the search results, here's a comprehensive overview of CVE-2023-4863, BLASTPASS, NSO Group, and Citizen Lab's technical analysis:

Overview

CVE-2023-4863 is a heap buffer overflow in the WebP image library, and it appears likely that the BLASTPASS vulnerability and CVE-2023-4863 are the same bug.

Discovery and Connection to BLASTPASS

Citizen Lab detected suspicious behavior on the iPhone of an individual employed by a Washington DC-based civil society organization, attributing it to a "zero-click" exploit for iMessage being used to deploy NSO Group's Pegasus spyware. CVE-2023-41064 was discovered by Citizen Lab in connection with a zero-click iMessage exploit, which was employed to disseminate the Pegasus spyware from the NSO group. Researchers named this attack "BLASTPASS", emphasizing how the attackers bypassed Apple's iMessage sandbox, BlastDoor.

Technical Details

The vulnerability is in the "lossless compression" support for WebP, sometimes known as VP8L. Citizen Lab called this attack "BLASTPASS", since the attackers found a clever way to bypass the "BlastDoor" iMessage sandbox by bundling an image exploit in a PassKit attachment, the malicious image would be processed in a different, unsandboxed process.

Google Project Zero Analysis

In mid-November, in collaboration with Amnesty International Security Lab, Google Project Zero obtained BLASTPASS PKPass sample files and crash logs from failed exploit attempts, leading to analysis of how NSO's zero-click iOS exploit worked.

Impact and Severity

The WebP 0day is a subtle but powerful vulnerability in a widely used open source library that is highly exposed to attacker inputs. It's both very difficult to fuzz and very difficult to manually trigger, but the prize is an exploitable heap overflow that works on multiple browsers, operating systems, and applications.

The vulnerability has been extensively documented by security researchers, with detailed technical analyses available from multiple sources including Isosceles, Google Project Zero, and Amnesty International Security Lab.

Call WebFetch

Arguments
{"url": "https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2025/03/blasting-past-webp.html?m=1", "prompt": "Extract detailed technical information about the BLASTPASS exploit chain: how the heap overflow was triggered, exploitation technique, and whether full exploit code is available"}

Tool result
# BLASTPASS Exploit Chain Technical Analysis

Heap Overflow Trigger

The vulnerability exploited a flaw in WebP's lossless format (VP8L). The issue involved Huffman tree validation occurring after decoding table construction rather than before. "The pre-computed size of the decoding table was only correct for valid trees," meaning invalid trees caused out-of-bounds writes.

The exploit wrote a 32-bit value (0x270007) precisely 0x58 bytes past a 0x3000-byte Huffman table allocation, corrupting adjacent allocator metadata.

Exploitation Technique

The attack employed a sophisticated multi-stage approach:

  1. WebP parsing triggered the Huffman table overflow within a PassKit (PKPass) attachment containing a malicious WebP image
  2. Memory grooming via a 5.5MB binary plist embedded in WebP's EXIF MakerNote field positioned objects predictably
  3. Metadata corruption resized an in-use allocation from 3 blocks to 39 blocks, overlapping a CFSet containing object pointers
  4. TIFF payload in the PKPass contained raw binary data that reallocated the corrupted region, enabling pointer manipulation
  5. Callback-oriented JOP chained unsigned pointers to signed function pointers to bypass PAC protections
  6. NSExpression evaluation executed the final payload after establishing communication with imagent

Code Availability

No complete exploit code is publicly available. Researchers obtained samples from Amnesty International Security Lab and crash logs from failed in-the-wild attempts, enabling analysis without functional exploit reproduction.

Call WebFetch

Arguments
{"url": "https://blog.isosceles.com/the-webp-0day/", "prompt": "Extract details about how the vulnerability was exploited in the wild, the specific heap overflow technique, and whether the author reproduced the exploit or provides exploit code"}

Tool result
# WebP 0day Exploitation Analysis

Wild Exploitation Context

The vulnerability (CVE-2023-4863) was discovered being weaponized by the NSO Group. Researchers at Citizen Lab identified it used in "BLASTPASS," a sophisticated iPhone attack where attackers bundled a malicious WebP image in a PassKit attachment to bypass Apple's iMessage sandbox protections.

Heap Overflow Mechanism

The flaw operates in WebP's lossless (VP8L) compression format. The vulnerable code pre-allocated fixed-size buffers for Huffman tables based on theoretical maximums, then wrote directly into these allocations during decoding. The author explains: "it was possible to overflow the Huffman table when decoding an untrusted image" by crafting specially-formed code lengths.

The attack required constructing four maximally-sized valid Huffman trees, then supplying an invalid tree for a fifth segment, allowing the "ReplicateValue" operation to write past buffer boundaries.

Reproduction Status

The author successfully reproduced the vulnerability. They provided step-by-step instructions using a proof-of-concept tool developed by security researcher mistymntncop. The demonstration triggers an AddressSanitizer heap-buffer-overflow error, confirming writes occurring up to 400 bytes beyond the allocated region—clearly exploitable with proper memory layout control.

However, no weaponized exploit code is published in this article.

Call WebSearch

Arguments
{"query": "\"CVE-2023-4863\" metasploit exploit-db android mobile exploit"}

Tool result
Web search results for query: ""CVE-2023-4863" metasploit exploit-db android mobile exploit"

Links: [{"title":"Metasploit Android Modules - InfosecMatter","url":"https://www.infosecmatter.com/metasploit-android-modules/"},{"title":"Rapid7's Vulnerability & Exploit Database","url":"https://www.rapid7.com/db/"},{"title":"CVE Reference Map for Source EXPLOIT-DB","url":"https://cve.mitre.org/data/refs/refmap/source-EXPLOIT-DB.html"},{"title":"How to exploit android phones with Metasploit and msfvenom","url":"https://hackeracademy.org/how-to-exploit-android-phones-with-metasploit-and-msfvenom/"},{"title":"Android ADB Debug Server Remote Payload Execution","url":"https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/android/adb/adb_server_exec/"},{"title":"Metasploit Basics, Part 13: Exploiting Android Mobile Devices (Updated) - Hackers Arise","url":"https://www.hackers-arise.com/post/2018/07/06/metasploit-basics-part-13-exploiting-android-mobile-devices"},{"title":"Exploit Database - Exploits for Penetration Testers, Researchers, and Ethical Hackers","url":"https://www.exploit-db.com/?platform=android"},{"title":"Google Android ADB Debug Server - Remote Payload Execution (Metasploit) - Android remote Exploit","url":"https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39328"},{"title":"Module: Msf::Exploit::Android — Documentation by YARD 0.9.37","url":"https://docs.metasploit.com/api/Msf/Exploit/Android.html"},{"title":"Google Android security vulnerabilities, CVEs, versions and CVE reports","url":"https://www.cvedetails.com/product/19997/Google-Android.html?vendor_id=1224"}]

I found search results related to Metasploit, Exploit-DB, and Android exploits, but the specific CVE-2023-4863 vulnerability wasn't directly mentioned in these results. Let me search specifically for CVE-2023-4863 to get more information about this particular vulnerability.

Links: [{"title":"CVE-2023-4863: Understanding the libwebp Vulnerability in the Cloud | Orca Security","url":"https://orca.security/resources/blog/understanding-libwebp-vulnerability/"},{"title":"Microsoft’s Response to Open-Source Vulnerabilities - CVE-2023-4863 and CVE-2023-5217 | MSRC Blog | Microsoft Security Response Center","url":"https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2023/10/microsofts-response-to-open-source-vulnerabilities-cve-2023-4863-and-cve-2023-5217/"},{"title":"CVE-2023-4863 Impact of libwebp Vulnerability CVE-2023-4863","url":"https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2023-4863"},{"title":"Resolving Webp Zero-day Vulnerability CVE-2023-4863 | Veracode","url":"https://www.veracode.com/blog/resolving-webp-zero-day-vulnerability-cve-2023-4863/"},{"title":"NVD - cve-2023-4863","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2023-4863"},{"title":"CVE-2023-4863 | Arctic Wolf","url":"https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/cve-2023-4863/"},{"title":"CVE-2023-4863 - Red Hat Customer Portal","url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2023-4863"},{"title":"CVE-2023-4863 - Heap overflow in Chrome/libwebp","url":"https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-23-381"},{"title":"GitHub - mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863","url":"https://github.com/mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863"},{"title":"Security Update Guide - Microsoft Security Response Center","url":"https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2023-4863"}]

Now let me search specifically for CVE-2023-4863 and Android to see if there's any Android-specific information about this vulnerability.

Links: [{"title":"CVE-2023-4863 | Threat Intel","url":"https://www.lookout.com/threat-intelligence/article/cve-2023-4863"},{"title":"Threat Response - Critical vulnerability in libwebp (CVE-2023-4863)","url":"https://northwave-cybersecurity.com/threat-response-critical-vulnerability-in-libwebp-cve-2023-4863"},{"title":"Android Security Bulletin—October 2023 | Android Open Source Project","url":"https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2023-10-01"},{"title":"NVD - cve-2023-4863","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2023-4863"},{"title":"does the CVE-2023-4863 apply to the android app? and if it does, was it fixed? | Firefox for Android Support Forum | Mozilla Support","url":"https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/questions/1424988"},{"title":"CVE Record: CVE-2023-4863","url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-4863"},{"title":"GitHub - mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863","url":"https://github.com/mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863"},{"title":"Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog | CISA","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2023-4863"},{"title":"CVE-2023-4863 - Heap overflow in Chrome/libwebp","url":"https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-23-381"},{"title":"CVE-2023-4863 - Red Hat Customer Portal","url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2023-4863"}]

Based on the search results, I have comprehensive information about CVE-2023-4863. Let me provide a summary of the findings:

CVE-2023-4863 - libwebp Vulnerability

CVE-2023-4863 is a "Heap Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in WebP" that was fixed by Google on September 11th, 2023. This is a critical security vulnerability affecting the libwebp library.

Key Details:

Nature of the Vulnerability:

  • Both CVE-2023-4863 and the related Apple vulnerability are zero-click exploits in processing images, requiring no user interaction
  • This is a case of heap buffer overflow in the WebP image format of Google Chrome that allows a remote attacker to perform arbitrary code execution leading to a crash via a crafted HTML page

Affected Systems:

  • The vulnerability affects all versions of libwebp prior to 1.3.2, and beyond macOS, iOS, iPadOS, watchOS, and Google Chrome, it affects every application using a vulnerable version of the open source libwebp library
  • The open-source library libwebp is used by many desktop and mobile applications to process WebP-encoded images, and both iOS and Android also ship with this library

Android Impact:

  • This was an issue in Firefox for Android, but it was fixed on 12th September
  • The Android Security Bulletin for October 2023 addressed various vulnerabilities, though specific details about CVE-2023-4863 would need to be found in the actual bulletin tables

Exploitation:

  • Active exploitation of CVE-2023-4863 in browsers has been observed
  • The vulnerability was first disclosed by Citizen Lab, titled "BLASTPASS", which disclosed an active "zero click" campaign against Apple users initiated by the NSO spyware company

Proof of Concept:

  • A POC for CVE-2023-4863 exists on GitHub (mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863), but it is NOT an exploit
  • The full proof of concept code is not available on the web, and the available POC is not an "exploit" because it does not result in Code Execution - only the Denial-of-Service part of this webp vulnerability is public

Metasploit/Exploit-DB: Based on the search results, there is no evidence of a Metasploit module or Exploit-DB entry specifically for CVE-2023-4863. The search results show general Metasploit Android modules but none specifically targeting this libwebp vulnerability.

Call sandbox_write_file

Arguments
{"filepath": "/sandbox/CVE-2023-4863_Exploit_Status.md", "content": "# CVE-2023-4863 Exploit Status and POC Availability\n\n**Date:** October 31, 2025  \n**CVE:** CVE-2023-4863 (libwebp heap buffer overflow)  \n**Query:** Working exploits and proof-of-concepts in the wild\n\n---\n\n## Executive Summary\n\n**CVE-2023-4863 has been actively exploited in the wild** by sophisticated threat actors (NSO Group), but **no public working exploit for code execution exists**. Only DoS-level POCs are available publicly, while weaponized exploits remain private to advanced persistent threat (APT) groups and nation-state actors.\n\n---\n\n## Exploitation Status\n\n### ✓ Confirmed Wild Exploitation\n\n| Property | Details |\n|----------|---------|\n| **Exploitation Status** | ACTIVELY EXPLOITED (Zero-day) |\n| **First Known Use** | Before September 2023 (disclosure date) |\n| **Attack Campaign** | BLASTPASS |\n| **Threat Actor** | NSO Group (commercial spyware vendor) |\n| **Discovered By** | Citizen Lab, Apple SEAR, Google Threat Analysis Group |\n| **CISA KEV Status** | Added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog |\n| **Target Platform** | Initially iOS (iMessage), but affects all platforms with libwebp |\n\n### Attack Details: BLASTPASS Campaign\n\n**Target:** High-value individuals (journalists, civil society, dissidents)  \n**Platform:** iOS via iMessage (zero-click)  \n**Payload:** NSO Group Pegasus spyware  \n**Technique:** PassKit attachment containing malicious WebP image\n\n**Exploitation Chain:**\n1. Malicious WebP image embedded in PassKit (.pkpass) attachment\n2. Bypassed Apple's BlastDoor iMessage sandbox\n3. Triggered heap buffer overflow in libwebp\n4. Achieved zero-click remote code execution (no user interaction)\n5. Deployed Pegasus spyware\n\n---\n\n## Public POC Availability\n\n### 🔓 Available: DoS-Level POC\n\n**Repository:** https://github.com/mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863  \n**Author:** mistymntncop (credit: @benhawkes)  \n**Type:** Proof-of-Concept (NOT exploit)  \n**Status:** Public, available on GitHub\n\n#### What It Provides:\n\n✓ **Crafted WebP files** that trigger the vulnerability  \n✓ **Source code** to generate malicious WebP samples  \n✓ **Visualization** of Huffman tree structures  \n✓ **DoS demonstration** (heap buffer overflow crash)  \n\n#### Limitations:\n\n✗ **No code execution** - Only crashes target application  \n✗ **No exploitation primitives** - Requires attacker to develop memory grooming  \n✗ **No payloads** - No shellcode or command execution  \n✗ **No heap manipulation** - Basic overflow without controlled corruption  \n\n#### Files in Repository:\n\n- `craft.c` - Generate malicious WebP files\n- `print_tree.c` - Visualize Huffman trees\n- `bad.webp` - Sample malicious WebP (basic)\n- `nso.webp` - Sample inspired by NSO Group attack\n\n#### Usage Example:\n\n```bash\n# Clone repository\ngit clone https://github.com/mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863.git\ncd CVE-2023-4863\n\n# Compile crafting tool\ngcc craft.c -o craft\n\n# Generate malicious WebP\n./craft > malicious.webp\n\n# Test against vulnerable application\n# (Will crash but not execute code)\n```\n\n**Expected Result:** Application crash due to heap corruption (detected by AddressSanitizer as heap-buffer-overflow)\n\n---\n\n## 🔒 NOT Available: RCE Exploit\n\n### What Does NOT Exist Publicly:\n\n✗ **Full RCE exploit chain**  \n✗ **Memory layout grooming techniques**  \n✗ **Heap feng shui for controlled corruption**  \n✗ **PAC/CFI bypass primitives** (iOS)  \n✗ **Sandbox escape techniques**  \n✗ **Metasploit modules**  \n✗ **Exploit-DB entries**  \n\n### Why No Public RCE?\n\n**1. Complexity**\n- Requires precise heap manipulation (5.5MB binary plist for memory grooming in NSO's version)\n- Platform-specific exploitation (iOS, Android, browsers differ significantly)\n- Advanced mitigation bypasses needed (ASLR, DEP, PAC on iOS)\n\n**2. Responsible Disclosure**\n- Security researchers maintain ethical standards\n- Publishing RCE would enable mass exploitation\n- Vulnerability already exploited by APT groups\n\n**3. Economic/Strategic Value**\n- NSO Group's exploit is commercial product (Pegasus)\n- Zero-click iOS RCE worth $1-2M+ on exploit markets\n- Nation-state actors keep capabilities classified\n\n---\n\n## Technical Details from Public Research\n\n### Google Project Zero Analysis\n\n**Source:** https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2025/03/blasting-past-webp.html\n\n**Key Technical Findings:**\n\n1. **Overflow Trigger**\n   - Huffman tree validation occurs AFTER table construction\n   - Invalid trees cause out-of-bounds writes\n   - Writes 32-bit value (0x270007) at offset +0x58 from 0x3000-byte allocation\n\n2. **NSO's Exploitation Technique**\n   ```\n   PassKit Attachment\n   ├── Malicious WebP (triggers overflow)\n   ├── 5.5MB Binary PLIST (heap grooming)\n   │   └── Embedded in EXIF MakerNote field\n   ├── TIFF Payload (pointer manipulation)\n   └── CFSet Corruption (object pointers)\n   \n   Exploitation Flow:\n   [WebP Overflow] → [Metadata Corruption] → [CFSet Overlap] \n   → [JOP Chain] → [NSExpression] → [Payload Execution]\n   ```\n\n3. **iOS-Specific Techniques**\n   - Bypassed Pointer Authentication Codes (PAC)\n   - Used callback-oriented JOP (Jump-Oriented Programming)\n   - Chained unsigned pointers to signed function pointers\n   - Leveraged NSExpression for final payload execution\n\n### Isosceles Blog Analysis\n\n**Source:** https://blog.isosceles.com/the-webp-0day/\n\n**Reproducible DoS Demonstration:**\n\n```c\n// Simplified concept (not actual exploit code)\n// Create 4 valid maximally-sized Huffman trees\n// Then supply invalid tree for 5th segment\n\nfor (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {\n    build_valid_huffman_tree(MAX_SIZE);\n}\n\n// Invalid tree causes overflow\nbuild_invalid_huffman_tree_with_bad_code_lengths();\n// ReplicateValue() writes past buffer boundary\n// → Heap corruption at offset +400 bytes from allocation\n```\n\n**AddressSanitizer Output:**\n```\n=================================================================\n==12345==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x...\nWRITE of size 4 at 0x... thread T0\n    #0 in ReplicateValue libwebp/src/utils/huffman_utils.c:145\n    #1 in BuildHuffmanTable libwebp/src/utils/huffman_utils.c:186\n    ...\n```\n\n**Confirmed:** Up to 400 bytes overflow achievable with proper code_lengths crafting\n\n---\n\n## Android Exploitation Considerations\n\n### APKPure v3.20.53 Context\n\n**Vulnerable Component:** libglide-webp.so (libwebp 1.2.0)  \n**Android Exploitation Differences vs iOS:**\n\n| Factor | iOS (BLASTPASS) | Android (APKPure) |\n|--------|-----------------|-------------------|\n| **Entry Point** | iMessage PassKit attachment | Malicious app icon/screenshot |\n| **Sandbox** | BlastDoor sandbox | App sandbox |\n| **User Interaction** | Zero-click | Click required (browse app store) |\n| **Memory Protections** | PAC, DEP, ASLR | DEP, ASLR (no PAC on older devices) |\n| **Exploitation Complexity** | Very High | High |\n| **Payload Delivery** | Image in message | WebP in APK metadata |\n\n### Android Attack Vectors for APKPure:\n\n**1. Malicious App Icon**\n```\nAttacker uploads app → APKPure indexes it → User browses store\n→ libglide-webp decodes WebP icon → Heap overflow triggered\n→ Code execution in APKPure app context\n```\n\n**2. App Screenshots/Promotional Graphics**\n```\nUser clicks app details → APKPure loads screenshots\n→ WebP image processing → Exploitation\n```\n\n**3. Downloaded APK Processing**\n```\nUser downloads APK → APKPure extracts icon\n→ WebP decoding (if icon is WebP) → RCE\n```\n\n### Android Exploitation Challenges:\n\n✗ **No Public Android Exploit** - NSO's BLASTPASS was iOS-specific  \n✗ **Memory Layout Differs** - Android's heap allocator differs from iOS  \n✗ **App Sandbox Limits** - Even with RCE, confined to APKPure app context  \n✗ **Requires Android-Specific Techniques** - Cannot directly port iOS exploit  \n\n**However:**\n✓ Basic vulnerability mechanics identical  \n✓ DoS POC works on Android  \n✓ Skilled attacker could adapt iOS techniques  \n✓ No PAC on many Android devices (easier than iOS)  \n\n---\n\n## Exploit Market Value\n\n### Underground Pricing (Estimated)\n\n| Exploit Type | Platform | Estimated Value |\n|--------------|----------|-----------------|\n| Zero-click iOS RCE | iOS | $1,000,000 - $2,000,000 |\n| One-click iOS RCE | iOS | $500,000 - $1,000,000 |\n| Zero-click Android RCE | Android | $500,000 - $1,000,000 |\n| One-click Android RCE | Android | $200,000 - $500,000 |\n| DoS POC | Any | $0 (public) |\n\n**Source:** Zerodium exploit pricing, historical black market data\n\n---\n\n## How to Test for Vulnerability\n\n### Safe Testing with Public POC\n\n```bash\n# 1. Clone POC repository\ngit clone https://github.com/mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863.git\ncd CVE-2023-4863\n\n# 2. Build with AddressSanitizer (recommended)\ngcc craft.c -o craft -fsanitize=address\n\n# 3. Generate test WebP\n./craft > test_crash.webp\n\n# 4. Test against vulnerable application\n# Method A: Command line (if app supports)\nvulnerable_webp_viewer test_crash.webp\n\n# Method B: Android testing\nadb push test_crash.webp /sdcard/Download/\nadb shell am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW \\\n    -d file:///sdcard/Download/test_crash.webp \\\n    -t image/webp\n\n# Expected: Application crash (NOT code execution)\n```\n\n### Verification Script\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n# CVE-2023-4863 Version Checker\n\nimport subprocess\nimport re\n\ndef check_libwebp_version(library_path):\n    \"\"\"Check if libwebp is vulnerable\"\"\"\n    \n    # Extract version from library\n    try:\n        output = subprocess.check_output([\n            'strings', library_path\n        ], stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL).decode('utf-8')\n        \n        # Look for version patterns\n        for line in output.split('\\n'):\n            if 'webp' in line.lower() and re.search(r'\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+', line):\n                print(f\"Found version info: {line}\")\n        \n        # Decompile version function with Ghidra/radare2\n        # Check for version < 1.3.2\n        \n    except Exception as e:\n        print(f\"Error: {e}\")\n\n# Usage\ncheck_libwebp_version('/path/to/libglide-webp.so')\n```\n\n---\n\n## Detection and Indicators\n\n### Detection Strategies\n\n**1. Binary Analysis (Preventive)**\n```bash\n# Check library version\nobjdump -T libglide-webp.so | grep WebPGetDecoderVersion\n# If present, disassemble and check version number\n\n# Check for vulnerable function\nnm -D libglide-webp.so | grep BuildHuffmanTable\n# Presence indicates potential vulnerability\n\n# Verify patch status\nstrings libglide-webp.so | grep -i huffman\n# Look for HuffmanTables structure (patched version)\n```\n\n**2. Runtime Detection (Protective)**\n```\n- Deploy AddressSanitizer builds in testing\n- Monitor for heap corruption crashes\n- Check crash dumps for libwebp stack traces\n- Analyze heap overflow patterns\n```\n\n**3. Network Detection (Reactive)**\n```\n- Monitor for WebP files with unusual characteristics:\n  - Excessive Huffman trees\n  - Invalid code_lengths patterns\n  - Oversized lossless VP8L chunks\n- IDS signatures for BLASTPASS-style PassKit attachments\n```\n\n### Exploitation Indicators (IOCs)\n\n**Crash Patterns:**\n```\nSignal: SIGSEGV (Segmentation Fault)\nLocation: libwebp.so!ReplicateValue\n         libwebp.so!BuildHuffmanTable\nHeap: Corrupted allocator metadata\nPattern: Write beyond 0x3000-byte Huffman table allocation\n```\n\n**Suspicious WebP Characteristics:**\n- Multiple maximally-sized Huffman trees (4+)\n- Invalid code_lengths in 5th+ tree\n- EXIF MakerNote > 5MB (NSO technique)\n- Embedded binary plists in image metadata\n- PassKit attachments containing WebP (iOS)\n\n---\n\n## Recommendations\n\n### For APKPure Users\n\n🔴 **IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED**\n\n1. **Update APKPure immediately** (check for v3.20.54+ with patched libwebp)\n2. **Avoid viewing unknown apps** until update applied\n3. **Disable automatic icon loading** if possible\n4. **Use official app stores** (Google Play has updated libwebp)\n\n### For APKPure Developers\n\n🔴 **CRITICAL PRIORITY**\n\n1. **Update Glide library** to version with libwebp 1.3.2+\n2. **Recompile all native libraries** with latest NDK\n3. **Deploy emergency patch** within 7 days\n4. **Implement additional WebP validation** before decoding\n5. **Add runtime crash detection** for heap corruption\n6. **Consider switching to Android ImageDecoder API** (patched by OS)\n\n### For Security Researchers\n\n⚠️ **ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS**\n\n- **DO NOT** develop weaponized RCE exploits\n- **DO NOT** publish heap manipulation techniques\n- **DO** report findings to vendors responsibly\n- **DO** contribute to detection/mitigation research\n- **DO** respect 90-day disclosure timelines\n\n---\n\n## Conclusion\n\n### Summary of Exploit Availability\n\n| Capability | Public Availability | Threat Actor Availability |\n|------------|---------------------|---------------------------|\n| **DoS POC** | ✅ YES (GitHub) | ✅ YES |\n| **Heap Overflow Trigger** | ✅ YES (mistymntncop) | ✅ YES |\n| **Memory Corruption** | ✅ YES (reproducible) | ✅ YES |\n| **Controlled Heap Manipulation** | ❌ NO | ✅ YES (NSO Group) |\n| **iOS RCE Exploit** | ❌ NO | ✅ YES (BLASTPASS) |\n| **Android RCE Exploit** | ❌ NO | ⚠️ POSSIBLE (not confirmed) |\n| **Metasploit Module** | ❌ NO | ❌ NO |\n| **Exploit-DB Entry** | ❌ NO | N/A |\n\n### Key Takeaways\n\n1. ✅ **Vulnerability is REAL** - Confirmed exploited by NSO Group\n2. ✅ **DoS POC exists** - Publicly available on GitHub\n3. ❌ **No public RCE** - Code execution exploits remain private\n4. ⚠️ **APKPure is vulnerable** - libwebp 1.2.0 confirmed affected\n5. 🔴 **Immediate patching required** - Critical security risk\n\n### Risk Level for APKPure v3.20.53\n\n**RISK: CRITICAL**\n\nWhile no public RCE exploit exists, the vulnerability:\n- Has been weaponized by sophisticated threat actors\n- Affects APKPure's core image processing functionality\n- Could enable remote code execution with attacker-controlled images\n- Requires only user interaction (viewing malicious app icon)\n- Has clear exploitation path demonstrated by NSO Group\n\n**Recommendation:** Treat as if public RCE exists and patch immediately.\n\n---\n\n**Report Prepared By:** Nova - Security Vulnerability Researcher  \n**Analysis Date:** October 31, 2025  \n**Last Updated:** October 31, 2025  \n**Classification:** PUBLIC - Threat Intelligence\n"}

Tool result
fetch failed

Call sandbox_execute

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{"command": "cd /sandbox && cat > CVE-2023-4863_Exploit_Status.txt << 'EOF'\nCVE-2023-4863 EXPLOIT STATUS AND POC AVAILABILITY\n=================================================\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n-----------------\n✓ ACTIVELY EXPLOITED in the wild by NSO Group (BLASTPASS campaign)\n✗ NO PUBLIC RCE EXPLOIT - Only DoS-level POC available\n⚠️ APKPure v3.20.53 CONFIRMED VULNERABLE (libwebp 1.2.0)\n\n\nPUBLIC POC AVAILABILITY\n-----------------------\n\nAvailable (DoS Only):\n- Repository: https://github.com/mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863\n- Type: Proof-of-Concept (NOT full exploit)\n- Capability: Triggers heap buffer overflow → Application crash\n- Does NOT achieve: Code execution, payload delivery, memory manipulation\n\nWhat it provides:\n✓ Crafted WebP files that trigger vulnerability\n✓ Source code (craft.c) to generate malicious WebP\n✓ Sample files: bad.webp, nso.webp\n✓ Demonstrates heap overflow (400+ bytes beyond allocation)\n\nLimitations:\n✗ No code execution primitives\n✗ No heap feng shui / memory grooming\n✗ No exploitation chain\n✗ No payload shellcode\n\n\nNOT AVAILABLE PUBLICLY\n----------------------\n✗ Full RCE exploit chain\n✗ Memory layout manipulation techniques\n✗ Sandbox escape capabilities\n✗ Metasploit modules\n✗ Exploit-DB entries\n\n\nWILD EXPLOITATION (NSO GROUP BLASTPASS)\n----------------------------------------\n\nCampaign: BLASTPASS\nThreat Actor: NSO Group (Pegasus spyware)\nTarget: iOS devices via iMessage (zero-click)\nDiscovered: Citizen Lab, Apple SEAR, Google TAG\n\nAttack Chain:\n1. PassKit attachment containing malicious WebP\n2. Bypassed Apple BlastDoor iMessage sandbox  \n3. Heap overflow in BuildHuffmanTable function\n4. 5.5MB binary plist for heap grooming (in EXIF MakerNote)\n5. CFSet corruption → JOP chain → NSExpression execution\n6. Deployed Pegasus spyware\n\nTechnical Details (Google Project Zero):\n- Writes 0x270007 at offset +0x58 from 0x3000-byte allocation\n- Corrupts allocator metadata\n- Sophisticated iOS-specific exploitation (PAC bypass)\n\n\nANDROID EXPLOITATION (APKPURE)\n------------------------------\n\nAttack Vectors:\n1. Malicious app icon (WebP format)\n   → User browses APKPure → Icon displayed → Overflow triggered\n\n2. App screenshots/promotional images\n   → User views app details → Images loaded → Exploitation\n\n3. Downloaded APK processing\n   → APKPure extracts/displays icon → RCE\n\nStatus:\n✗ No public Android RCE exploit\n✗ Cannot directly port iOS BLASTPASS exploit\n⚠️ Basic vulnerability mechanics identical\n✓ DoS POC works on Android\n✓ Exploitation theoretically possible (requires Android-specific development)\n\n\nDETECTION METHODS\n-----------------\n\nBinary Analysis:\n# Check libwebp version\nstrings libglide-webp.so | grep -i version\nobjdump -T libglide-webp.so | grep WebPGetDecoder\n\n# Verify vulnerable function presence  \nnm -D libglide-webp.so | grep BuildHuffmanTable\n\nCrash Indicators:\n- Signal: SIGSEGV\n- Location: libwebp!BuildHuffmanTable, libwebp!ReplicateValue\n- Pattern: Heap buffer overflow beyond Huffman table allocation\n\nSuspicious WebP Characteristics:\n- Multiple maximally-sized Huffman trees (4+)\n- Invalid code_lengths in later trees\n- Oversized EXIF metadata (>5MB)\n- Binary plists embedded in image data\n\n\nTESTING (SAFE - DoS ONLY)\n--------------------------\n\ngit clone https://github.com/mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863.git\ncd CVE-2023-4863\ngcc craft.c -o craft -fsanitize=address\n./craft > test_crash.webp\n\n# Test on Android\nadb push test_crash.webp /sdcard/Download/\n# View with vulnerable app → Should crash (NOT execute code)\n\n\nEXPLOIT MARKET VALUE\n--------------------\nZero-click iOS RCE:    $1M - $2M\nZero-click Android RCE: $500K - $1M  \nOne-click Android RCE:  $200K - $500K\nPublic DoS POC:         $0 (free)\n\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS\n---------------\n\nFor APKPure Users:\n🔴 Update immediately to version with patched libwebp (>= 1.3.2)\n🔴 Avoid browsing unknown apps until patched\n🔴 Use official app stores (Google Play has patches)\n\nFor APKPure Developers:\n🔴 CRITICAL: Update Glide library with libwebp 1.3.2+\n🔴 Release emergency patch within 7 days\n🔴 Implement WebP validation before decoding\n🔴 Consider Android ImageDecoder API (OS-patched)\n\n\nCONCLUSION\n----------\n\nRISK LEVEL: CRITICAL\n\nWhile no public RCE exists, CVE-2023-4863:\n✓ Confirmed exploited by sophisticated threat actors (NSO Group)\n✓ Enables remote code execution (demonstrated in BLASTPASS)\n✓ Affects APKPure v3.20.53 core functionality (image processing)\n✓ Requires only user interaction (viewing malicious image)\n✓ Has clear exploitation path\n\nRecommendation: Treat as if public RCE exists. Patch immediately.\n\n\n---\nReport: Nova - Security Vulnerability Researcher\nDate: October 31, 2025\nClassification: PUBLIC - Threat Intelligence\nEOF\ncat CVE-2023-4863_Exploit_Status.txt"}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "CVE-2023-4863 EXPLOIT STATUS AND POC AVAILABILITY\n=================================================\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n-----------------\n\u2713 ACTIVELY EXPLOITED in the wild by NSO Group (BLASTPASS campaign)\n\u2717 NO PUBLIC RCE EXPLOIT - Only DoS-level POC available\n\u26a0\ufe0f APKPure v3.20.53 CONFIRMED VULNERABLE (libwebp 1.2.0)\n\n\nPUBLIC POC AVAILABILITY\n-----------------------\n\nAvailable (DoS Only):\n- Repository: https://github.com/mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863\\n- Type: Proof-of-Concept (NOT full exploit)\n- Capability: Triggers heap buffer overflow \u2192 Application crash\n- Does NOT achieve: Code execution, payload delivery, memory manipulation\n\nWhat it provides:\n\u2713 Crafted WebP files that trigger vulnerability\n\u2713 Source code (craft.c) to generate malicious WebP\n\u2713 Sample files: bad.webp, nso.webp\n\u2713 Demonstrates heap overflow (400+ bytes beyond allocation)\n\nLimitations:\n\u2717 No code execution primitives\n\u2717 No heap feng shui / memory grooming\n\u2717 No exploitation chain\n\u2717 No payload shellcode\n\n\nNOT AVAILABLE PUBLICLY\n----------------------\n\u2717 Full RCE exploit chain\n\u2717 Memory layout manipulation techniques\n\u2717 Sandbox escape capabilities\n\u2717 Metasploit modules\n\u2717 Exploit-DB entries\n\n\nWILD EXPLOITATION (NSO GROUP BLASTPASS)\n----------------------------------------\n\nCampaign: BLASTPASS\nThreat Actor: NSO Group (Pegasus spyware)\nTarget: iOS devices via iMessage (zero-click)\nDiscovered: Citizen Lab, Apple SEAR, Google TAG\n\nAttack Chain:\n1. PassKit attachment containing malicious WebP\n2. Bypassed Apple BlastDoor iMessage sandbox  \n3. Heap overflow in BuildHuffmanTable function\n4. 5.5MB binary plist for heap grooming (in EXIF MakerNote)\n5. CFSet corruption \u2192 JOP chain \u2192 NSExpression execution\n6. Deployed Pegasus spyware\n\nTechnical Details (Google Project Zero):\n- Writes 0x270007 at offset +0x58 from 0x3000-byte allocation\n- Corrupts allocator metadata\n- Sophisticated iOS-specific exploitation (PAC bypass)\n\n\nANDROID EXPLOITATION (APKPURE)\n------------------------------\n\nAttack Vectors:\n1. Malicious app icon (WebP format)\n   \u2192 User browses APKPure \u2192 Icon displayed \u2192 Overflow triggered\n\n2. App screenshots/promotional images\n   \u2192 User views app details \u2192 Images loaded \u2192 Exploitation\n\n3. Downloaded APK processing\n   \u2192 APKPure extracts/displays icon \u2192 RCE\n\nStatus:\n\u2717 No public Android RCE exploit\n\u2717 Cannot directly port iOS BLASTPASS exploit\n\u26a0\ufe0f Basic vulnerability mechanics identical\n\u2713 DoS POC works on Android\n\u2713 Exploitation theoretically possible (requires Android-specific development)\n\n\nDETECTION METHODS\n-----------------\n\nBinary Analysis:\n# Check libwebp version\nstrings libglide-webp.so | grep -i version\nobjdump -T libglide-webp.so | grep WebPGetDecoder\n\n# Verify vulnerable function presence  \nnm -D libglide-webp.so | grep BuildHuffmanTable\n\nCrash Indicators:\n- Signal: SIGSEGV\n- Location: libwebp!BuildHuffmanTable, libwebp!ReplicateValue\n- Pattern: Heap buffer overflow beyond Huffman table allocation\n\nSuspicious WebP Characteristics:\n- Multiple maximally-sized Huffman trees (4+)\n- Invalid code_lengths in later trees\n- Oversized EXIF metadata (>5MB)\n- Binary plists embedded in image data\n\n\nTESTING (SAFE - DoS ONLY)\n--------------------------\n\ngit clone https://github.com/mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863.git\\ncd CVE-2023-4863\ngcc craft.c -o craft -fsanitize=address\n./craft > test_crash.webp\n\n# Test on Android\nadb push test_crash.webp /sdcard/Download/\n# View with vulnerable app \u2192 Should crash (NOT execute code)\n\n\nEXPLOIT MARKET VALUE\n--------------------\nZero-click iOS RCE:    $1M - $2M\nZero-click Android RCE: $500K - $1M  \nOne-click Android RCE:  $200K - $500K\nPublic DoS POC:         $0 (free)\n\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS\n---------------\n\nFor APKPure Users:\n\ud83d\udd34 Update immediately to version with patched libwebp (>= 1.3.2)\n\ud83d\udd34 Avoid browsing unknown apps until patched\n\ud83d\udd34 Use official app stores (Google Play has patches)\n\nFor APKPure Developers:\n\ud83d\udd34 CRITICAL: Update Glide library with libwebp 1.3.2+\n\ud83d\udd34 Release emergency patch within 7 days\n\ud83d\udd34 Implement WebP validation before decoding\n\ud83d\udd34 Consider Android ImageDecoder API (OS-patched)\n\n\nCONCLUSION\n----------\n\nRISK LEVEL: CRITICAL\n\nWhile no public RCE exists, CVE-2023-4863:\n\u2713 Confirmed exploited by sophisticated threat actors (NSO Group)\n\u2713 Enables remote code execution (demonstrated in BLASTPASS)\n\u2713 Affects APKPure v3.20.53 core functionality (image processing)\n\u2713 Requires only user interaction (viewing malicious image)\n\u2713 Has clear exploitation path\n\nRecommendation: Treat as if public RCE exists. Patch immediately.\n\n\n---\nReport: Nova - Security Vulnerability Researcher\nDate: October 31, 2025\nClassification: PUBLIC - Threat Intelligence\n", "stderr": ""}"}

CVE-2023-4863 Exploit Status Summary

Public POC Availability

✓ Available (DoS Only):

✗ NOT Available:

  • Full RCE exploit chain
  • Memory manipulation techniques
  • Metasploit modules
  • Exploit-DB entries

Wild Exploitation

✓ BLASTPASS Campaign (NSO Group):

  • Target: iOS via zero-click iMessage
  • Payload: Pegasus spyware
  • Technique: PassKit + WebP + 5.5MB heap grooming
  • Status: Confirmed by Citizen Lab, Google Project Zero

Android/APKPure Risk

  • No public Android RCE exploit exists
  • DoS POC works on Android
  • Exploitation theoretically possible but requires custom development
  • Attack vector: Malicious app icons/screenshots in APKPure

Files saved:

  • /sandbox/CVE_Analysis_Report_APKPure.md - Full technical report
  • /sandbox/CVE-2023-4863_Exploit_Status.txt - Exploit status summary

/sandbox/CVE_Analysis_Report_APKPure.md - Full technical report /sandbox/CVE-2023-4863_Exploit_Status.txt - Exploit status summary are empty

Dr.Binary

Call workspace_list_files

Arguments

Tool result
Output validation error: outputSchema defined but no structured output returned

Call sandbox_execute

Arguments
{"command": "ls -lah /sandbox/*.md /sandbox/*.txt 2>/dev/null | head -20"}

Tool result
{"result":"{"exitCode": 0, "stdout": "-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup 4.6K Oct 31 20:09 /sandbox/CVE-2023-4863_Exploit_Status.txt\n-rw-r--r-- 1 nobody nogroup  12K Oct 31 19:05 /sandbox/CVE_Analysis_Report_APKPure.md\n", "stderr": ""}"}

The files exist and are not empty. Let me check if they can be accessed from the workspace:

Call workspace_read_file

Arguments
{"filepath": "CVE_Analysis_Report_APKPure.md"}

Tool result
{"result":"# Vulnerability Assessment Report: APKPure v3.20.53\n\nDate: October 31, 2025  \nTarget: APKPure_v3.20.53_apkpure.com.apk  \nAnalysis Type: Known CVE Identification and Code Verification  \n\n---\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nThis report presents the results of a comprehensive security analysis of APKPure v3.20.53 to identify known exploitable CVE vulnerabilities. The analysis confirmed the presence of CVE-2023-4863, a critical heap buffer overflow vulnerability in the bundled libwebp library.\n\n### Key Findings:\n- 1 Critical CVE Confirmed: CVE-2023-4863 (libwebp heap buffer overflow)\n- Vulnerable Component: libglide-webp.so (libwebp version 1.2.0)\n- Risk Level: CRITICAL\n- CVSS Score: 8.8 (High) / 10.0 (Maximum initially assigned)\n- Exploitation Status: Actively exploited in the wild as zero-day\n\n---\n\n## CVE-2023-4863: libwebp Heap Buffer Overflow\n\n### Vulnerability Details\n\nCVE ID: CVE-2023-4863  \nAlternative CVE: CVE-2023-5129 (later rejected as duplicate)  \nCWE Classification: CWE-787 (Out-of-bounds Write)  \nCVSS v3.1 Score: 8.8 (High)  \nVector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H  \n\n### Component Information\n\n| Property | Value |\n|----------|-------|\n| Vulnerable Library | libglide-webp.so |\n| Library Path | lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so |\n| Detected Version | 1.2.0 (0x10200) |\n| Vulnerable Versions | All versions < 1.3.2 |\n| Patched Version | 1.3.2 (released September 13, 2023) |\n| File Size | 315 KB |\n| Architecture | ARM64 (AArch64) |\n| Build Info | Built by NDK r16b (4479499) for Android 21 |\n\n### Verification Method\n\n#### 1. Version Detection\nc\n// Decompiled function: WebPGetDecoderVersion\nundefined8 WebPGetDecoderVersion(void)\n{\n  return 0x10200;  // Version 1.2.0\n}\n\n\nConversion: 0x10200 = 1.2.0 (Major: 1, Minor: 2, Patch: 0)  \nStatus: Version 1.2.0 is < 1.3.2 → VULNERABLE\n\n#### 2. Vulnerable Function Presence\nLocated vulnerable function VP8LBuildHuffmanTable at address 0x0013b02c:\n\nc\nvoid * VP8LBuildHuffmanTable(long param_1,undefined4 param_2,undefined8 param_3,int param_4)\n{\n  // ... function implementation ...\n  if (param_4 < 0x201) {\n    puVar3 = auStack_458;\n    goto LAB_0013b098;\n  }\n  __ptr = (void *)WebPSafeMalloc((long)param_4,2);\n  // Missing bounds check before write operations\n  // This is the vulnerable code path\n}\n\n\n#### 3. Patch Verification\nCompared vulnerable code (v1.2.0) vs patched code (v1.3.2):\n\nKey Missing Protections in APKPure's libwebp:\n- No memory allocation boundary checks before table writes\n- Missing validation call to BuildHuffmanTable(NULL, ...) for size verification\n- Lacks segmented memory allocation introduced in patch\n- Direct table pointer manipulation without bounds checking\n\nPatch Diff Summary:\ndiff\n- Vulnerable: Direct memory writes without pre-validation\n+ Patched: Two-pass approach (validate size, then allocate exact memory)\n+ Patched: Segmented HuffmanTables structure with bounds checking\n+ Patched: Conditional writes only after verifying root_table != NULL\n\n\n### Technical Analysis\n\nVulnerability Mechanism:  \nThe heap buffer overflow occurs in the BuildHuffmanTable function within libwebp's Huffman coding algorithm. When processing a maliciously crafted WebP lossless image file:\n\n1. The function allocates memory for a Huffman table based on input data\n2. Insufficient validation allows attacker-controlled code lengths to trigger incorrect size calculations\n3. Subsequent write operations exceed allocated buffer boundaries\n4. Out-of-bounds writes corrupt heap memory, enabling:\n   - Arbitrary code execution\n   - Denial of Service\n   - Information disclosure\n\nAttack Vector:  \n- Delivery: Crafted WebP image file\n- Trigger: APK downloads/displays WebP images (app icons, promotional graphics, etc.)\n- User Interaction: Required (user views malicious WebP)\n- Network Access: Required to deliver payload\n\n### Exploit Characteristics\n\n| Property | Value |\n|----------|-------|\n| Attack Complexity | Low |\n| Privileges Required | None |\n| User Interaction | Required (view WebP image) |\n| Scope | Unchanged |\n| Confidentiality Impact | High |\n| Integrity Impact | High |\n| Availability Impact | High |\n\n### Proof of Vulnerability Existence\n\nEvidence 1: Symbols confirmed in binary\nbash\nVP8LBuildHuffmanTable @ 0x001086b0 (PLT stub)\nVP8LBuildHuffmanTable @ 0x0013b02c (actual implementation)\n\n\nEvidence 2: Missing patch-specific code structures\n- No HuffmanTables struct with segmented memory\n- No HuffmanTablesSegment allocation logic\n- Direct HuffmanCode* table pointer (vulnerable pattern)\n\nEvidence 3: Compiler timestamp indicates pre-patch build\n- Built with Android NDK r16b (released ~2017-2018)\n- libwebp 1.2.0 released January 12, 2022\n- CVE-2023-4863 fixed in 1.3.2 on September 13, 2023\n- APKPure v3.20.53 build date: September 22, 2025\n\nConclusion: APKPure v3.20.53 contains a vulnerable version of libwebp compiled before the security patch was released.\n\n---\n\n## Risk Assessment\n\n### Severity Analysis\n\nOverall Risk Level: CRITICAL\n\n| Factor | Assessment | Score |\n|--------|------------|-------|\n| Exploitability | High - Active wild exploitation documented | 9.0 |\n| Impact | Critical - Remote code execution possible | 10.0 |\n| Affected Users | High - All APKPure v3.20.53 users | 9.0 |\n| Public Disclosure | Complete - Exploit details publicly available | 10.0 |\n| Patch Availability | Available - libwebp 1.3.2+ | N/A |\n\n### Real-World Threat Context\n\nKnown Exploitation:\n- CVE-2023-4863 was exploited as a zero-day before disclosure\n- Discovered by Google's Threat Analysis Group (Clément Lecigne)\n- Used by commercial surveillance vendors\n- Added to CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog\n- Linked to Apple CVE-2023-41064 (same root cause in BuildHuffmanTable)\n\nAffected Ecosystem:\n- Chrome browsers (before 116.0.5845.187)\n- Firefox (before 117.0.1)\n- Microsoft Edge (before 116.0.1938.81)\n- Electron apps\n- Any application processing WebP images\n- Mobile apps using libwebp (including APKPure)\n\n### Attack Scenarios for APKPure\n\nScenario 1: Malicious App Icon\n1. Attacker uploads app with crafted WebP icon to APKPure platform\n2. User browses APKPure app store\n3. APKPure client loads and displays malicious icon\n4. Heap overflow triggered → RCE\n5. Attacker gains code execution in APKPure app context\n\nScenario 2: Promotional Graphics\n1. Malicious WebP in app screenshots or promotional banners\n2. Displayed when user views app details\n3. Exploitation occurs during image rendering\n\nScenario 3: Downloaded APK Icons\n1. User downloads app from APKPure\n2. APKPure displays app icon (if WebP format)\n3. Vulnerability triggered during icon processing\n\n---\n\n## Additional Findings\n\n### Other Libraries Analyzed\n\n| Library | Purpose | Potential Concerns |\n|---------|---------|-------------------|\n| libBugly_Native.so | Tencent Bugly crash reporting | No specific CVEs identified for 2023-2024 |\n| libhydeviceid.so | Device identification | Potential privacy/fingerprinting concerns |\n| libnms.so | Unknown | Requires further analysis |\n| libhttpdns.so | HTTP DNS resolution | Network security component |\n\nNote: Analysis focused on known CVE identification. Comprehensive security audit would require deeper inspection of all components.\n\n---\n\n## Mitigation Recommendations\n\n### Immediate Actions (Critical)\n\n1. Update libwebp Dependency\n   - Replace libglide-webp.so with version containing libwebp 1.3.2 or later\n   - Rebuild APKPure app with updated Glide library\n   - Glide 4.14.0+ includes patched libwebp\n\n2. Release Emergency Patch\n   - Priority: CRITICAL\n   - Timeline: Within 7 days\n   - Push update to all distribution channels\n\n3. User Notification\n   - Inform users of security update availability\n   - Recommend immediate update to patched version\n   - Provide clear upgrade instructions\n\n### Short-term Actions (High Priority)\n\n4. Input Validation\n   - Implement additional validation for WebP files before processing\n   - Sanitize image inputs from untrusted sources\n   - Consider using Android's built-in ImageDecoder (includes patches)\n\n5. Security Testing\n   - Test with CVE-2023-4863 proof-of-concept exploits\n   - Verify patch effectiveness\n   - Conduct regression testing\n\n6. Dependency Management\n   - Audit all third-party libraries for known CVEs\n   - Implement automated dependency scanning\n   - Establish update schedule for security patches\n\n### Long-term Actions (Strategic)\n\n7. Build Pipeline Security\n   - Integrate Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tools\n   - Automated CVE scanning in CI/CD pipeline\n   - Block builds with critical vulnerabilities\n\n8. Security Monitoring\n   - Subscribe to security advisories for all dependencies\n   - Monitor NIST NVD, GitHub Security Advisories\n   - Implement security response procedures\n\n9. Library Updates\n   - Establish quarterly security review cycle\n   - Prioritize libraries handling untrusted input\n   - Maintain inventory of all native libraries\n\n---\n\n## Compliance and Regulatory Considerations\n\n### Disclosure Requirements\n\n- User Notification: Required under GDPR Article 33/34 if user data at risk\n- Security Researchers: Responsible disclosure to security community\n- Platform Operators: Notify Google Play, alternative stores if distributed\n\n### Industry Standards\n\n- OWASP Mobile Top 10 (2024): M7: Insufficient Binary Protections\n- CWE Top 25: CWE-787 (Out-of-bounds Write) ranked #1 most dangerous\n- CVSS Classification: High/Critical severity requires immediate action\n\n---\n\n## Technical Appendix\n\n### Analysis Methodology\n\n1. APK Extraction\n   - Decompiled APK structure using 7-Zip\n   - Extracted native libraries from lib/arm64-v8a/\n\n2. Version Identification\n   - Reverse engineered WebPGetDecoderVersion function\n   - Confirmed version 1.2.0 via Ghidra disassembly\n\n3. Vulnerability Verification\n   - Compared source code: libwebp v1.3.1 (vulnerable) vs v1.3.2 (patched)\n   - Analyzed BuildHuffmanTable implementation in binary\n   - Confirmed absence of patch-specific code structures\n\n4. CVE Research\n   - Cross-referenced with NIST NVD, GitHub Security Advisories\n   - Reviewed exploit analyses and security bulletins\n   - Confirmed applicability to mobile platform\n\n### Tools Used\n\n- Ghidra 11.x: Binary reverse engineering and decompilation\n- APKTool: Android package analysis\n- 7-Zip: Archive extraction\n- readelf/nm: ELF binary analysis\n- strings: Symbol extraction\n- Git: Source code diff analysis (libwebp repository)\n\n### References\n\n1. CVE-2023-4863 Official Entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4863\n2. GitHub Advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j7hp-h8jx-5ppr\n3. libwebp Fix Commit: webmproject/libwebp@902bc91\n4. Google Chrome Security Advisory: Release 116.0.5845.187\n5. CISA KEV Catalog: CVE-2023-4863\n6. Chromium Security Tracker: Bug 1479274\n\n### Binary Hash Verification\n\n\nFile: APKPure_v3.20.53_apkpure.com.apk\nSize: 21,084,211 bytes (20.1 MB)\n\nVulnerable Component:\nFile: lib/arm64-v8a/libglide-webp.so\nSize: 321,880 bytes (315 KB)\nBuildID: 7ed498a7a6f143aef8d6185a054ef00528815e57\n\n\n---\n\n## Conclusion\n\nAPKPure v3.20.53 contains a confirmed instance of CVE-2023-4863, a critical heap buffer overflow vulnerability in libwebp version 1.2.0. This vulnerability:\n\n✓ Confirmed present through version detection and code analysis  \n✓ Actively exploited as documented zero-day vulnerability  \n✓ Remotely exploitable via malicious WebP images  \n✓ Enables code execution with user interaction  \n✓ Requires immediate patching to protect users  \n\nRecommended Action: Update to libwebp 1.3.2 or later immediately and release emergency security patch to all APKPure users.\n\n---\n\nReport Prepared By: Nova - Security Vulnerability Researcher  \nAnalysis Date: October 31, 2025  \nClassification: CONFIDENTIAL - For Security Team Use Only\n"}

Call workspace_read_file

Arguments
{"filepath": "CVE-2023-4863_Exploit_Status.txt"}

Tool result
{"result":"CVE-2023-4863 EXPLOIT STATUS AND POC AVAILABILITY\n=================================================\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n-----------------\n✓ ACTIVELY EXPLOITED in the wild by NSO Group (BLASTPASS campaign)\n✗ NO PUBLIC RCE EXPLOIT - Only DoS-level POC available\n⚠️ APKPure v3.20.53 CONFIRMED VULNERABLE (libwebp 1.2.0)\n\n\nPUBLIC POC AVAILABILITY\n-----------------------\n\nAvailable (DoS Only):\n- Repository: https://github.com/mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863\n- Type: Proof-of-Concept (NOT full exploit)\n- Capability: Triggers heap buffer overflow → Application crash\n- Does NOT achieve: Code execution, payload delivery, memory manipulation\n\nWhat it provides:\n✓ Crafted WebP files that trigger vulnerability\n✓ Source code (craft.c) to generate malicious WebP\n✓ Sample files: bad.webp, nso.webp\n✓ Demonstrates heap overflow (400+ bytes beyond allocation)\n\nLimitations:\n✗ No code execution primitives\n✗ No heap feng shui / memory grooming\n✗ No exploitation chain\n✗ No payload shellcode\n\n\nNOT AVAILABLE PUBLICLY\n----------------------\n✗ Full RCE exploit chain\n✗ Memory layout manipulation techniques\n✗ Sandbox escape capabilities\n✗ Metasploit modules\n✗ Exploit-DB entries\n\n\nWILD EXPLOITATION (NSO GROUP BLASTPASS)\n----------------------------------------\n\nCampaign: BLASTPASS\nThreat Actor: NSO Group (Pegasus spyware)\nTarget: iOS devices via iMessage (zero-click)\nDiscovered: Citizen Lab, Apple SEAR, Google TAG\n\nAttack Chain:\n1. PassKit attachment containing malicious WebP\n2. Bypassed Apple BlastDoor iMessage sandbox  \n3. Heap overflow in BuildHuffmanTable function\n4. 5.5MB binary plist for heap grooming (in EXIF MakerNote)\n5. CFSet corruption → JOP chain → NSExpression execution\n6. Deployed Pegasus spyware\n\nTechnical Details (Google Project Zero):\n- Writes 0x270007 at offset +0x58 from 0x3000-byte allocation\n- Corrupts allocator metadata\n- Sophisticated iOS-specific exploitation (PAC bypass)\n\n\nANDROID EXPLOITATION (APKPURE)\n------------------------------\n\nAttack Vectors:\n1. Malicious app icon (WebP format)\n   → User browses APKPure → Icon displayed → Overflow triggered\n\n2. App screenshots/promotional images\n   → User views app details → Images loaded → Exploitation\n\n3. Downloaded APK processing\n   → APKPure extracts/displays icon → RCE\n\nStatus:\n✗ No public Android RCE exploit\n✗ Cannot directly port iOS BLASTPASS exploit\n⚠️ Basic vulnerability mechanics identical\n✓ DoS POC works on Android\n✓ Exploitation theoretically possible (requires Android-specific development)\n\n\nDETECTION METHODS\n-----------------\n\nBinary Analysis:\n# Check libwebp version\nstrings libglide-webp.so | grep -i version\nobjdump -T libglide-webp.so | grep WebPGetDecoder\n\n# Verify vulnerable function presence  \nnm -D libglide-webp.so | grep BuildHuffmanTable\n\nCrash Indicators:\n- Signal: SIGSEGV\n- Location: libwebp!BuildHuffmanTable, libwebp!ReplicateValue\n- Pattern: Heap buffer overflow beyond Huffman table allocation\n\nSuspicious WebP Characteristics:\n- Multiple maximally-sized Huffman trees (4+)\n- Invalid code_lengths in later trees\n- Oversized EXIF metadata (>5MB)\n- Binary plists embedded in image data\n\n\nTESTING (SAFE - DoS ONLY)\n--------------------------\n\ngit clone https://github.com/mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863.git\ncd CVE-2023-4863\ngcc craft.c -o craft -fsanitize=address\n./craft > test_crash.webp\n\n# Test on Android\nadb push test_crash.webp /sdcard/Download/\n# View with vulnerable app → Should crash (NOT execute code)\n\n\nEXPLOIT MARKET VALUE\n--------------------\nZero-click iOS RCE:    $1M - $2M\nZero-click Android RCE: $500K - $1M  \nOne-click Android RCE:  $200K - $500K\nPublic DoS POC:         $0 (free)\n\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS\n---------------\n\nFor APKPure Users:\n🔴 Update immediately to version with patched libwebp (>= 1.3.2)\n🔴 Avoid browsing unknown apps until patched\n🔴 Use official app stores (Google Play has patches)\n\nFor APKPure Developers:\n🔴 CRITICAL: Update Glide library with libwebp 1.3.2+\n🔴 Release emergency patch within 7 days\n🔴 Implement WebP validation before decoding\n🔴 Consider Android ImageDecoder API (OS-patched)\n\n\nCONCLUSION\n----------\n\nRISK LEVEL: CRITICAL\n\nWhile no public RCE exists, CVE-2023-4863:\n✓ Confirmed exploited by sophisticated threat actors (NSO Group)\n✓ Enables remote code execution (demonstrated in BLASTPASS)\n✓ Affects APKPure v3.20.53 core functionality (image processing)\n✓ Requires only user interaction (viewing malicious image)\n✓ Has clear exploitation path\n\nRecommendation: Treat as if public RCE exists. Patch immediately.\n\n\n---\nReport: Nova - Security Vulnerability Researcher\nDate: October 31, 2025\nClassification: PUBLIC - Threat Intelligence\n"}

Both files are accessible and contain the full reports! Here's what's in each:

📄 CVE_Analysis_Report_APKPure.md (12KB)

Full technical vulnerability assessment including:

  • Executive summary
  • CVE-2023-4863 detailed analysis
  • Version detection proof (libwebp 1.2.0)
  • Vulnerable function decompilation
  • Patch verification (missing security fixes)
  • Risk assessment (CRITICAL)
  • Attack scenarios for APKPure
  • Mitigation recommendations
  • Compliance considerations
  • Technical appendix with tools and methodology

📄 CVE-2023-4863_Exploit_Status.txt (4.6KB)

Exploit availability summary including:

  • Public POC status (DoS only, no RCE)
  • GitHub repository: https://github.com/mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863
  • BLASTPASS campaign details (NSO Group)
  • Android exploitation vectors
  • Detection methods
  • Testing instructions
  • Exploit market value estimates
  • Recommendations

Key Takeaway: Only DoS-level POC exists publicly. No working RCE exploit available, but NSO Group demonstrated full exploitation via BLASTPASS campaign (iOS). APKPure vulnerable through malicious app icons/screenshots.