Analysis

Reverse engineer binary: summarize behavior, key functions, suspicious/vulnerable items

Analysis:
Matched binary to vendor release, extracted strings and imports from a readable copy, tried Ghidra but used metadata + string/import analysis.
Conclusion:
Confirmed FrekansLoL v3.0.6 skin-changer: injects DLL into League process, automates LCU actions, performs device fingerprinting and paid license checks; no exfi

Tools: todo_write, run_sandbox, inspect_binary, dump_data, list_files, find_files, web_search, web_fetch, task, read_file, write_file

Run it yourself
FrekansLoL v4.exe

Reverse engineer this binary: summarize what it does, key functions, and any suspicious or vulnerable behavior.

Dr.Binary

I'll start by inspecting the binary, then load the Ghidra analysis workflow for deeper analysis.

todo_write
run_sandbox

The file was saved with a + instead of a space (FrekansLoL+v4.exe). Continuing with that name:

run_sandbox

Odd — I/O errors reading the file. Let me investigate:

run_sandbox
run_sandbox

The file sits on a FUSE-backed mount that's returning EIO on reads. Let me probe whether any part is readable and try alternate access paths:

run_sandbox

Every read from the shell fails with EIO — the file's contents aren't accessible via the workspace mount. Let me try the analysis tools, which may access the file through a different backend path (/sandbox/):

run_sandbox
inspect_binary

The analysis tools can read the file (they use a different backend path than the sandbox shell, which is hitting EIO). Good triage info already: 43.7 MB PE32+ x64 Windows GUI app, MSVC-linked, PDB name frekanslol.pdb, importing process-memory APIs (OpenProcess, ReadProcessMemory), DeviceIoControl, networking (ws2_32), crypto (bcrypt, crypt32). Let me run the full Ghidra decompilation — it's a large binary, so this will take a while:

run_sandbox
dump_data
Error calling tool 'dump_data': Ghidra pod did not finish before timeout. Pod log (last 20 lines):
Exception while decompiling 1404f89b0: process: timeout

Exception while decompiling 140500760: process: timeout

Exception while decompiling 140505140: process: timeout

Progress: 86197/111149 (77%)
Analysis failed for 0x1405107f0
Exception while decompiling 140e2d990: process: timeout

Progress: 91502/111149 (82%)
Analysis failed for 0x140c54790
Progress: 93405/111149 (84%)
Exception while decompiling 140575d80: process: timeout

Exception while decompiling 1405852a0: process: timeout


Low-level Error: Backward normalization not implemented
Progress: 94716/111149 (85%)

Ghidra timed out partway (111k functions — heavily statically-linked binary). Let me check if partial results were written, and retry with what's available:

list_files
run_sandbox
Error calling tool 'run_sandbox': Could not reach the sandbox to mount the Workspace at /data/google-oauth2-117202453629727959942/1cd85c1e-540b-4077-b8a7-f6ff11861fdf — 1 attempts over 126s all failed (Failed to execute command: ). The command was not run, so retrying it is safe.
run_sandbox
Error calling tool 'run_sandbox': Failed to create sandbox: <html>
<head><title>504 Gateway Time-out</title></head>
<body>
<center><h1>504 Gateway Time-out</h1></center>
</body>
</html>
run_sandbox
Error calling tool 'run_sandbox': Failed to create sandbox: <html>
<head><title>504 Gateway Time-out</title></head>
<body>
<center><h1>504 Gateway Time-out</h1></center>
</body>
</html>

The sandbox is flaky, but the analysis-tool pod is separate. Let me check for partial Ghidra output via the file tools:

find_files
find_files
find_files

No partial output was saved. The tool pod reads the file fine (inspect_binary worked), so let me retry the Ghidra dump, and in parallel search the web to identify what "FrekansLoL" is:

web_search
dump_data
Error calling tool 'dump_data': Ghidra pod finished with phase Failed. Pod log (last 20 lines):
Copying binary to local /tmp/FrekansLoL v4.exe...
Opening project FrekansLoL v4.exe-569efc...
Loading binary FrekansLoL v4.exe...
Running Ghidra auto-analysis (this can take minutes)...
WARNING: A terminally deprecated method in sun.misc.Unsafe has been called
WARNING: sun.misc.Unsafe::staticFieldOffset has been called by org.apache.felix.framework.util.SecureAction (file:/opt/ghidra/Ghidra/Features/Base/lib/org.apache.felix.framework-7.0.5.jar)
WARNING: Please consider reporting this to the maintainers of class org.apache.felix.framework.util.SecureAction
WARNING: sun.misc.Unsafe::staticFieldOffset will be removed in a future release

Identified via web: FrekansLoL / "Frekans Studio" is a Turkish League of Legends custom skin manager / skin changer (GitHub frekans911/frekanslol), part of the CSLOL/LTK skin-mod ecosystem. Now let me get the source repo details and retry the Ghidra dump in parallel:

run_sandbox
web_fetch

The repo confirms: closed-source Windows app, skin changer + mod manager, with in-app account login and paid license activation (explains crypto/network APIs). Sandbox output was empty — let me verify shell health and try radare2 directly (the tool pod can read the file; maybe the shell can too):

run_sandbox
run_sandbox
run_sandbox
run_sandbox

Shell access to the file is definitively broken (EIO) — only the analysis pod can read it. Retrying the Ghidra dump (nondeterministic timeouts so far), plus researching whether this binary has been flagged anywhere:

dump_data
Error calling tool 'dump_data': Ghidra pod finished with phase Failed. Pod log (last 20 lines):
Copying binary to local /tmp/FrekansLoL v4.exe...
Opening project FrekansLoL v4.exe-569efc...
Loading binary FrekansLoL v4.exe...
Running Ghidra auto-analysis (this can take minutes)...
WARNING: A terminally deprecated method in sun.misc.Unsafe has been called
WARNING: sun.misc.Unsafe::staticFieldOffset has been called by org.apache.felix.framework.util.SecureAction (file:/opt/ghidra/Ghidra/Features/Base/lib/org.apache.felix.framework-7.0.5.jar)
WARNING: Please consider reporting this to the maintainers of class org.apache.felix.framework.util.SecureAction
WARNING: sun.misc.Unsafe::staticFieldOffset will be removed in a future release
web_search

Note: the second "Frekans Studio" (frekans.studio, binaural sound lab) is a different project — our binary matches the GitHub frekans911/frekanslol LoL skin changer. Ghidra failed again (43 MB / ~111k functions is beyond the pod's limits). One more attempt, plus checking the app's releases page:

dump_data
Error calling tool 'dump_data': Ghidra pod finished with phase Failed. Pod log (last 20 lines):
Copying binary to local /tmp/FrekansLoL v4.exe...
Opening project FrekansLoL v4.exe-569efc...
Loading binary FrekansLoL v4.exe...
Running Ghidra auto-analysis (this can take minutes)...
WARNING: A terminally deprecated method in sun.misc.Unsafe has been called
WARNING: sun.misc.Unsafe::staticFieldOffset has been called by org.apache.felix.framework.util.SecureAction (file:/opt/ghidra/Ghidra/Features/Base/lib/org.apache.felix.framework-7.0.5.jar)
WARNING: Please consider reporting this to the maintainers of class org.apache.felix.framework.util.SecureAction
WARNING: sun.misc.Unsafe::staticFieldOffset will be removed in a future release
web_fetch

Ghidra is definitively unable to finish this binary (4 failures, all in auto-analysis of ~111k functions). The compile timestamp (Nov 2, 02:52 UTC) matches the v3.0.6 release (Nov 2, 03:08 UTC) from the vendor's GitHub. Let me try one more extraction angle — a subagent on the analysis pod (where the file IS readable) to pull strings/components:

binary-identify: Extract strings from FrekansLoL EXE
read_file
Error: FrekansLoL v4.exe is 43789312 bytes, over the 10485760-byte limit; use run_sandbox

The subagent recovered strong evidence — it matched our binary byte-for-byte to the payload inside the vendor's official FrekansStudio_3.0.6_x64-setup.exe release and extracted strings from a readable copy. Let me verify these artifacts and spot-check key claims myself before reporting:

list_files
run_sandbox

Artifacts are present. Let me verify hashes and spot-check the key string claims independently:

run_sandbox

The vendor's installer hash matches its published SHA-256 exactly (71bc2c9a…733 ✔ authentic). Notably, the extracted 43 MB payload also hits EIO from the shell — same storage issue as the original — but the subagent read it via the tool pod. Let me verify the string artifacts and cross-check the payload identity myself:

run_sandbox
inspect_binary

Identity confirmed: the extracted payload is byte-for-byte the same binary as our file (same size, PDB GUID E6BF1FD3…, link time, computed checksum 0x029C8408, entrypoint, section layout) — and it comes from the vendor's hash-verified official installer. Now let me independently spot-check the subagent's key string claims:

run_sandbox

All claims verified. A few more greps to complete the behavioral picture and rule out classic malware indicators:

run_sandbox

Module map confirmed. Final negative checks for classic malware behaviors:

run_sandbox

Clean negative results. Let me check the two positive hits ("keylog", "clipboard") for context, then finalize:

run_sandbox
run_sandbox

"NoKeyLog" is a rustls TLS-library internal — benign. All verification complete. Let me finalize the report:

todo_write
write_file
todo_write

Full report saved to FREKANSLOL_REPORT.md. Summary:

What it is

FrekansLoL / "Frekans Studio" v3.0.6 — a freemium League of Legends skin changer / mod manager by Turkish dev frekans911 (closed-source; GitHub hosts releases only). 43.7 MB unsigned PE32+ x64, MSVC-linked Rust/Tauri 2.10.3 app (WebView2 frontend, tokio/reqwest/rustls). I proved identity: it's byte-identical (PDB GUID E6BF1FD3…, link time 2026‑11‑02 02:52 UTC, checksum 0x029C8408) to the payload of the vendor's official installer, which I hash-verified against the SHA-256 published in the vendor's release notes. Link time is 16 minutes before that release was published.

What it does (key functions, from 22k extracted strings + 475 imports)

  • Skin patch engine (patcher/host.rs): builds WAD patches (vendor ltk_* crates), spawns ltk_patcher_host.exe and injects cslol-dll.dll into League of Legends.exe via a sha256/export-verified host↔DLL handshake (cslol_hook); hard kill switch CSLOL_EOL_TIMESTAMP=1794988800 (2026‑11‑17).
  • LCU client automation: harvests LeagueClientUx.exe command line via PowerShell to get the port + remoting-auth-token, then auto-accepts queue, auto-picks/bans, bench-swaps, honors, replays queues, writes rune pages.
  • Marketplace/providers: api.divineskins.gg, runeforge.dev, LeagueSkins repo, Riot CDNs; Pengu Loader install; mod library with .fantome/.modpkg packaging.
  • Licensing: paid membership (30 TRY/45 days) with device fingerprinting (MachineGuid + SMBIOS UUID + CPU ID → frekanslol-device-v1), minisign-signed updater, GitHub update checks.

Suspicious / risky

  • DLL injection into a game process — core mechanism, not malware per se, but a Riot-ToR violation with ban risk. No Vanguard tampering, refuses elevated games, checks IFEO debugger hijacks.
  • Credential-access pattern: reads the LCU session token from a process command line (mitigated: scrubs tokens/emails/PUIDs from logs).
  • Device fingerprinting + entitlement calls to a closed third-party backend (divineskins.gg), unsigned distribution, and advice to add itself to antivirus exclusions.

Clean

Exhaustive negative searches found no browser credential theft, miner, clipboard hijack, scheduled tasks, service/driver installs, or file exfiltration. Persistence = optional autostart plugin only.

Caveats

Your sandbox couldn't read the file directly (FUSE EIO — I documented the workaround), and Ghidra couldn't decompile a 43 MB/111k-function binary in 4 attempts, so findings are metadata + full string evidence on a verified identical copy, not function-level decompilation. No dynamic execution was run.