Analysis
Find hardcoded secrets in MeshOS-Repeater firmware
- Analysis:
- Parsed the ESP32-S3 flash, rebuilt an ELF, decompiled with Ghidra and searched strings/refs for key-like blobs and auth code paths.
- Conclusion:
- Found two confirmed secrets: OTA API key 7e97c81e7f85a5657a1fcc0d59fc127d (X-MeshOS-Key) and MQTT broker password 8b680d584757980d1808b938cedbccfc (user meshos‑
Tools: todo_write, run_sandbox, skill, skill:ghidra-analysis, inspect_binary, dump_data, semantic_function_search
Run it yourselfLook through this firmware to find any hardcoded secrets like 16, 24, 32 or 64 byte AES encryption keys or similar
ESP32-S3 merged flash image (8MB): bootloader @0x0, partition table @0x8000, nvs, otadata, app0/app1 (app), spiffs, coredump. Let me carve the partitions and start hunting.
The merged image is smaller than the partition layout (only app0 is populated — app1/spiffs/coredump lie beyond EOF and are empty). Now let me scan NVS and the app for secret-looking strings.
NVS is blank (all 0xFF — freshly imaged). The app is "MeshOS-Repeater 1.6.3 (meshcore.co.uk)" — a MeshCore-compatible repeater. Notable strings already: X-MeshOS-Key, web.pwd=%s, pin=%s. Let me dig deeper.
Two 32-hex-char strings found (7e97c81e7f85a5657a1fcc0d59fc127d, 8b680d584757980d1808b938cedbccfc) plus a hardcoded X-MeshOS-Key header. Let me get binary context around each.
Two plaintext secrets already confirmed:
7e97c81e7f85a5657a1fcc0d59fc127d— sent asX-MeshOS-Keyheader to the OTA gateway athttp://167.99.90.25:8071/f8b680d584757980d1808b938cedbccfc— sits next to the MQTT observer config (167.99.90.25, topicmeshos/rpt/%s/rx, a,"sig":"signing field, usernamemeshos-device)
Now let me look for more: default passwords/PINs, base64-encoded AES keys, and any embedded identity keypair.
Confirmed a factory default: "The admin password ... The factory default is password". Let me check the secret string context, the WiFi-AP/WPA2 path, and scan for raw binary AES key blobs (16/32-byte high entropy).
WPA2, admin password shows the fallback AP reuses the admin password. Now let me verify the literal default password, look for other long hex/base64 blobs, and decompile the MQTT/OTA code to characterize the two hex secrets.
The web UI says heartbeats are "each signed with its own key" — so the 8b68... string's role needs verification. Let me decompile to see exactly how both hex strings are used.
The app image is a raw ESP32-S3 Xtensa image (rz-bin can't parse functions from it). Not packed — decompilation is appropriate. Let me dump it with Ghidra.
Error calling tool 'dump_data': Ghidra pod finished with phase Failed. Pod log (last 20 lines):
Copying binary to local /tmp/app0.bin...
Opening project app0.bin-3b732e...
Loading binary app0.bin...
Merging project back to /sandbox/projects...
Project flushed.
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "ProgramLoader.java", line 439, in ghidra.app.util.importer.ProgramLoader$Builder.load
Exception: Java Exception
The above exception was the direct cause of the following exception:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/app/ghidra_scripts/parse_all_functions.py", line 704, in <module>
with loader.load() as load_results:
~~~~~~~~~~~^^
ghidra.app.util.opinion.ghidra.app.util.opinion.LoadException: ghidra.app.util.opinion.LoadException: No load spec found
at ghidra.app.util.importer.ProgramLoader$Builder.getLoadSpec(ProgramLoader.java:584)
at ghidra.app.util.importer.ProgramLoader$Builder.load(ProgramLoader.java:469)
at ghidra.app.util.importer.ProgramLoader$Builder.load(ProgramLoader.java:439)
Ghidra can't load raw ESP images directly. Let me parse the ESP image format myself and rebuild it as an ELF that Ghidra can load.
ESP32-S3 layout confirmed: DROM 0x3c150020, IRAM 0x40374000/0x4037cfec, IROM 0x42000020, DRAM 0x3fc991e0. Let me repack this into a proper ELF for Ghidra.
Valid Xtensa ELF created. Now dumping with Ghidra (this may take a while for a 2MB firmware).
9191 functions decompiled. Now let me find the functions referencing both hex secrets.
Mass file scanning over this mount is too slow. Let me use the JSON metadata and semantic search instead.
Let me search the single analysis.json file for MQTT/OTA-related functions instead.
Ghidra references strings as DAT_<addr>. Let me compute the string vaddrs and grep the dump in parallel.
The MQTT session setup is found (port 0x75b=1883, IP literal). Ghidra labels strings via PTR_s_<name> — let me grep for the sanitized string labels instead.
Confirmed: 0x4200f21c connects MQTT with username meshos-device and password 8b680d.... Let me verify FUN_42038374 is the MQTT connect call and hunt for the default-password literal.
MQTT CONNECT builder confirmed — 8b680d... is the hardcoded broker password for username meshos-device. Now checking for the factory-default password literal and any remaining key blobs.
Factory-init function 0x42014b88 confirmed: admin password field is initialized with the literal "password". Final sweep: bootloader secrets + a relaxed raw-blob entropy scan.
Three high-entropy 16-byte candidates worth checking: 0x64294, 0x645bc, 0x1fc6c. Let me inspect their surroundings.
These sit near the AES S-box region — could be mbedtls constants. Let me find what references them.
No decompiled references — let me look at ASCII context around these blobs to classify them.
No code references found — let me identify the owning module via nearby strings.
The 0x642xx/0x645xx blobs sit next to WPA/SAE strings — ESP-IDF WiFi library crypto constants. Let me verify by locating literal-pool references to each candidate.
FUN_42023a20 loads four 32-byte constants — let me resolve the literal pool targets and trace this crypto path.
These are three 32-byte constants (plus the odd X+31×f string) referenced by app-level code near SHA-256 constants. Let me trace the callers.
That's X25519/Ed25519 curve constants (I recognize the group order edd3f55c...de14, base point Gx 1ad5258f..., and "0x58,0x66×31" is actually base-point Gy — Ghidra showed it as an ASCII "string"). Not secrets. Same for the WPA/SAE-region blobs. Final check: AirLink channel defaults and any leftover key-like strings.
Let me quickly verify one adjacent finding (a login handler flagged as bypassing password checks) before writing the report.
Ghidra mislabeled that comparison (the "function" is actually the "Password: " string) — so I'm dropping the bypass claim. One last sweep for auth headers, then I'll write the report.
Hardcoded Secrets in MeshOS-Repeater-HeltecV3-v1.6.3
Firmware: ESP32-S3 merged flash (2,050,576 B) — bootloader @0x0, nvs (blank/all-0xFF), otadata, app0 @0x10000 (1.99 MB, only populated app), app1/spiffs/coredump beyond EOF (empty). App is "MeshOS repeater 1.6.3 (meshcore.co.uk)", esp-idf v4.4.7.
Confirmed hardcoded secrets
1. OTA-gateway API key — 7e97c81e7f85a5657a1fcc0d59fc127d
- Located in
.rodata@0x3c161d80(app0 file offset0x11d78). - Set by function
0x42006b34(verified in decompiled code):FUN_4204e478(auStack_44, PTR_s_X_Target_URL_42000324); FUN_4204e478(auStack_34, param_4); // <url> FUN_42038c4c(param_2, auStack_44, auStack_34, 0, 1); FUN_4204e478(auStack_44, PTR_s_X_MeshOS_Key_42000328); FUN_4204e478(auStack_34, PTR_s_7e97c81e7f85a5657a1fcc0d59fc127d_4200032c); FUN_42038c4c(param_2, auStack_44, auStack_34, 0, 1); - Sent as HTTP header
X-MeshOS-Key: 7e97…withX-Target-URL: <url>to the update gatewayhttp://167.99.90.25:8071/f(board tagrpt_heltec_v3, manifesthttps://meshcore.co.uk/fw/firmware.json). Possession of the firmware grants use of that update service.
2. MQTT observer broker password — 8b680d584757980d1808b938cedbccfc
- Located @
0x3c16470f(file offset0x14707), next tomeshos-device,167.99.90.25and topic templates. - Used in
0x4200f21c(observer connect):FUN_42038374(session, clientId, "meshos-device", "8b680d…")→ MQTT CONNECT builder0x42038138, which sets the flags byte0xC0(username+password present) and writes both strings into the packet. Confirmed: usernamemeshos-device, password8b680d…, broker167.99.90.25:1883, client IDmeshosrpt-<id>, publishesmeshos/rpt/<id>/rx&meshos/rpt/<id>/status, subscribesmeshos/chat/control. Anyone with this firmware can impersonate a repeater on the observer MQTT network.
3. Factory-default admin password — password
- Factory-init function
0x42014b88copies the literal"password"into the admin-password field (offset 0x4c, 16-byte store). Protects the web UI (useradmin, HTTP Basic), the TCP CLI (port 23) and app sign-in; the fallback AP (meshosrpt-<id>) reuses it as its WPA2 passphrase when ≥8 chars. The web UI itself says: "The factory default is password, so please change it."
4. Default Bluetooth pairing PIN — 123456
- Documented in the UI ("6 digits, default 123456") and used as the factory default.
Ruled out (checked, not secrets)
- No hardcoded 16/24/32/64-byte AES keys. Channel keys and the per-device signing identity ("signed with its own key") are generated/stored per-device — NVS is blank in this image.
- High-entropy blobs I hunted down are standard crypto constants: Curve25519 group order
edd3f55c…de14(LE), Ed25519 base point Gx1ad5258f…6921, base point Gy (58 66 66 66…— Ghidra rendered it as the ASCII "string"Xfffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff), curve constantd = a3785913…0352(used by the X25519 Montgomery ladder at0x42023768), plus ESP-IDF WPA/SAE library tables near "SAE Hunting and Pecking".
IOCs
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| IPv4 | 167.99.90.25 (8071/tcp OTA gateway, 1883/tcp MQTT) |
| Header | X-MeshOS-Key: 7e97c81e7f85a5657a1fcc0d59fc127d, X-Target-URL |
| URLs | http://167.99.90.25:8071/f, https://meshcore.co.uk/fw/firmware.json, https://api.meshcore.nz/api/v1/config |
| MQTT | user meshos-device, pass 8b680d584757980d1808b938cedbccfc, topics `meshos/rpt//rx |
| Defaults | admin/web password password, BLE PIN 123456, AP SSID meshosrpt-<id> |
Recommendation: rotate the two service credentials (they're burned for every device shipped with this image), move them to per-device provisioning (NVS), and force a password change on first setup instead of the password/123456 defaults.
Artifacts: carved partitions in parts/, Ghidra-decompiled app (parts/app0.elf, 9,191 functions) at ghidra_data/app0.elf/ (key functions: 0x42006b34.c, 0x4200f21c.c, 0x42038138.c, 0x42014b88.c).
