Analysis

Find key for demo5 ciphertext

Analysis:
Tried statistical tests, XOR/periodic/keyed stream and many PRNG/cipher candidates, then coded brute-force sweeps.
Conclusion:
No key found yet; most likely a keystream from a seeded PRNG or modern cipher with an unknown 4-byte numeric seed—attack unfinished (need more context or to run

Tools: run_sandbox, todo_write, write_file, edit_file

Run it yourself
cipher_demo5.bin

anaylsis

Dr.Binary
run_sandbox
todo_write
run_sandbox

High entropy (~7.79, consistent with random/encrypted data for this size), no file signatures. 912 bytes = 57×16, so a block cipher is plausible. Let me check for block structure:

run_sandbox

No repeats or periodicity — statistically uniform. Let me try classic transformations (XOR key detection, known-magic-header derivation):

run_sandbox

Not simple XOR. Let me sweep common demo keys/ciphers (AES-ECB/CBC with classic keys, RC4, ChaCha20 with common key/nonce pairs) and score the results:

run_sandbox

No hit — top scores are at the noise baseline (~40%). Final checks: headerless compression at various offsets, and a strict randomness test:

run_sandbox
todo_write

Analysis: cipher_demo5.bin

Facts

PropertyValue
Size912 bytes (= 57 × 16, no remainder)
Typedata — no magic/signatures (binwalk: 0 hits)
Entropy7.794 bits/byte
Distinct bytes252/256, all values 0x00–0xFF present range
Chi² vs uniform244.5 (df=255, 95% critical ≈ 311.4) → passes as uniform random
16-byte blocks57 blocks, all unique (no ECB pattern)
Autocorrelation / ICNo periodicity at any lag 1–63; no repeating-XOR key length 1–32

What was ruled out (with evidence)

  1. Plain text / simple encoding — only ~38% printable under the best single-byte XOR (noise baseline); no base64/hex structure.
  2. Repeating-key XOR — per-column IC ≈ 0.0039 (random baseline 1/256) for every key length; no candidate above 0.03.
  3. Known-magic XOR — derived keys from ZIP/GZIP/PNG/PDF/7Z/ELF/GPG plaintext assumptions produce no consistent key.
  4. Headerless compression — zlib/lzma/bz2/gzip fail at every offset 0–63.
  5. Common-key symmetric decryption — 99 attempts: AES-128 (ECB/CBC/CTR) and RC4/ChaCha20/Salsa20 with classic demo keys (YELLOW SUBMARINE, 0123456789abcdef, zero key, password, secret, etc.). Best plaintext score 43% printable = noise.

Conclusion

The file is statistically indistinguishable from uniformly random bytes (chi² well below the uniformity rejection threshold, zero structure, zero repeats). This is exactly what you'd expect from the output of a modern cipher (AES-CBC/CTR, ChaCha20, …) with an unknown key — or from a file that is literally random filler.

It is not decryptable as-is. A proper cipher with an unknown key is unbreakable by ciphertext-only inspection; nothing here leaks a key or a plaintext crib.

To go further, I'd need one of:

  • the key/password (or the program that generated it — dump_data/decompile it and I'll extract the KDF and decrypt),
  • a plaintext/ciphertext sample pair from the same key (known-plaintext), or
  • the context it came from (challenge description, generator source).

If you have the encryptor binary or the challenge text, upload it and I can reverse the scheme and recover the plaintext.

how ? to get key ? with the hint "An optional assignment for 5 bonus grades. Knowledge about what is possible with Information Theory helps you build a secure system. So, using what you have learned so far in this course, try to decipher the following binary files with any programming language. Comment on this post: the guessed key used and the first few sentences from the deciphered text.

You will show a demo of your code to the class.
Every student is allowed to submit the correct answer to one question only.
Check the comments to see which file has not been deciphered yet to give it a try.

Hints: -The length of the first encryption key is 4. -The length of the key is unknown and might have numbers. -Shift might be used with XOR for encryption. -The language of the encrypted text is unknown. -Other methods might be used instead of the simple XOR encryption." with other files 1,2,3,4

Dr.Binary

The hints change everything — this is a coursework challenge (demo5, the one left after demos 1–4), with repeating-key XOR variants, a 4-byte first key, possible shift, numeric keys, and "other methods". My earlier pass only covered static periodic XOR — let me now systematically test the hint families. First, I'll verify whether any periodic byte-wise scheme exists (column χ² for all strides), then attack the position-dependent families:

run_sandbox

Stride χ² shows only noise-level bumps (expected max for 1200 tests ≈ 345). So no static periodic bijection — consistent with the "other methods / shift" hints, i.e. the keystream varies with position. Fixing the buggy whole-file test and running the position-dependent per-column brute force (XOR with key+index, key−index, key^index, per-cycle shifts, rotations):

run_sandbox

Whole-file transforms: best 0.416 = noise. Fixing the shape bug in the per-column attack:

run_sandbox

All noise — overfitting territory (0.57 printable = best-of-many-trials artifact). So demo5's scheme is genuinely non-periodic — matching the hint "other methods might be used instead of the simple XOR". The prime suspect: a keystream generator (RC4 / rand() / LCG / MT) seeded with a short numeric key. Let me attack that:

run_sandbox

No structure, no MT/glibc hits. Now the heavy hitter: RC4 with short keys ("other methods…", key len 4, "might have numbers"). Writing a C brute-forcer over key spaces:

write_file
run_sandbox

RC4 with numeric keys (111M keys, len 1–8): no hits. Next two tracks in parallel: (a) "rolling key" variants — key[i] = K[i%4] + s·t ("shift used with XOR" could mean the key itself shifts), and (b) block ciphers (DES/AES/Blowfish/ChaCha/XTEA) keyed by short 4-char passwords with padding:

run_sandbox

Rolling-key: 0.644 = overfitting noise (incoherent keys). Adding a UTF-8/Arabic-aware scoring filter (plaintext language is "unknown") to the C forcer, then sweeping the remaining RC4 keyspaces:

edit_file
run_sandbox

RC4 eliminated (~270M keys, both ASCII and UTF-8 scoring). Now the "other ciphers" sweep — block/stream ciphers keyed by 4-char numeric passwords with common padding schemes, plus word-list passwords:

write_file
run_sandbox

~700k password×scheme combos: nothing. Before asking for more material, one more structural family from the hints — chained/CBC-style XOR ("shift with XOR"): e.g. c[i] = p[i] ⊕ c[i−1] ⊕ K[i%4]. These reduce to periodic keys on a differenced stream, which I haven't tested:

run_sandbox
run_sandbox

Chained: noise. But there's one classic textbook family I haven't tested — autokey ciphers (keystream = key + plaintext itself; "first key length 4"!). Neat property: for XOR/ADD autokey the key cancels down each lag-column, leaving only ONE unknown byte per column — trivially brute-forceable:

run_sandbox

Autokey: noise. Final structural family: PRNG keystreams seeded with a 32-bit numeric seed ("key length 4", "might have numbers" = a 4-byte numeric seed!). Writing a C brute-forcer for xorshift32 / MSVC-rand / LCG / Java-Random / glibc-rand with early-abort text scoring:

write_file

Cleaning up that C file — it had leftover junk in the glibc branch. Rewriting it properly:

write_file
run_sandbox

glibc rand (16.7M seeds) and Java Random: nothing. Now the full 32-bit sweeps for xorshift32 / MSVC / LCG:

run_sandbox
run_sandbox
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